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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies a particular functionality for privacy-preserving systems, that
allows a user to demonstrate a proof showing that the user has been approved by
a number of authorities, without revealing their identities. We first consider this
functionality for two fundamental cryptosystems: digital signature schemes, and public key encryption schemes, and introduce a new notion “grade” for these systems.
Within this scope, we formalize two new primitives, graded signatures and graded
encryption.
Graded signature schemes enable a user to consolidate a set of signatures on a
message m originating from l different signers. The resulting consolidated signature
object on m reveals nothing more than the grade of the signature and the validity
of the original signatures without leaking the identity of the signers. On the other
hand, graded encryption schemes allow a sender to specify a numerical grade i for the
ciphertext during the encryption depending on the importance of the message. Users
can only decrypt messages directed to their identity at grade i as long as they have
contacted i authorities in sequential order. We present efficient constructions and
useful applications such as multi-stage games (e.g., “who wants to be a millionaire”)
played in a distributed fashion for graded encryption and anonymous petition system

ii
for graded signatures.
In systems having a large number of participants, e.g., large scale privacy-preserving
petitions, a graded signature scheme with linear size signatures will not be an efficient tool in practice. We observe that if we distribute the signing keys of the scheme
associated to different grades in an efficient way, we can obtain a graded signature
scheme that enjoys constant size signatures. In this direction, we revisit the problem
of minimizing the share size of a multi-secret sharing scheme (MSSS). To circumvent
the information-theoretic lower bound (Blundo [13]), we focus on the computational
setting, and present an efficient construction of the MSSS with share size only logarithmic in the number of secrets (hence effectively optimal).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A petition is a formal demand that enables a number of people to submit their requests about a certain issue to the relevant authority. In a regular (paper-based)
petition system, each individual provides a handwritten signature together with a
unique identifier in order to allow the authentication of the petition. Providing the
signatures with the identifiers also enables the receiver to detect the duplicates or
forged signatures effectively. However, collecting and verifying signatures by hand
requires a lot of time. Alternatively, the digital petition presents remarkable advantages: (i) it allows the petitioner to reach out more people, and (ii) it enables the
verification process to be automated, and to be implemented efficiently. But, the
traditional digital petition system also presents some challenge.
Consider the public service that White House provides, called We the People,
which enables the citizens to create and sign petitions for certain issues in order to
motivate the federal government to act on them. There are two types of thresholds
in the system: (i) the number of the signatures should exceed 150 to be searchable
1
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within the web site, (ii) the number of the signatures should exceed 100000 to require
response. If a petition crosses the second threshold within the designated period,
the White House will respond. The system requires the users need to provide some
information that can be considered as personal sensitive data 1 , in order to register
system and sign a petition. However, citizens may not want to reveal their personal
information to the government when their signatures are demanded on a petition,
especially about sensitive issues such as political opinion or religious belief. Thus,
this feature of the system may cause some loss of support in those particular issues.
Alternatively, a petition system that enables the signers to remain anonymous would
be desired in this sense.
Let us clarify it with another example. In many online communities, reputation
has become an essential instrument for evaluating trust. It can be viewed as a component of identity as created by other’s opinions. Consider the internet company
“Yelp”, a social-networking site, that provides an environment for users to submit
reviews on the products or services of local businesses such as restaurants. These
reviews enable each business to develop its reputation.
In all such systems, reputation affects the pseudonyms of the users rather than the
users, but the pseudonyms can be used to associate the users with a history of their
activities. However, in most environments, anonymity is a desired feature for users,
i.e., they do not want the pseudonyms to be used to identify their history. Consider
a message board similar to one discussed in [9]. The writers share some posts in the
board, and the readers rate the posts depending on their accuracy. Then, the writers
create their reputation based on the ratings collected from the readers, and attach this
1

According to Art. 8 of EU Protection Directive, the processing of personal data revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs shall be prohibited by the
member states.
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reputation to new post to be shared in order to increase the the attention the posts
may get. The readers now can evaluate these posts based on the writers’ reputation.
Thus, this message board enables us to highlight valuable posts. However, we want
the board to provide anonymity to the readers when they rate posts. Similar to
the privacy-preserving petition system discussed above, we want a mechanism that
enables one to present the approvals collected from distinct entities without revealing
their identities. In other words, we are interested in a special functionality in a
privacy-preserving setting, that allows a user to reveal only the number of sources
that he has contacted.
Within this framework, we introduce a new primitive that we call “graded signatures”, which meets the requirements discussed above. The primitive enables a
user to present a consolidation of a number of signatures (say `) collected from `
distinct signers on the same message without revealing the identities of signers. We
call `, “grade” of the combined signature. If there are n registered signers, the grade
will range in [1, n]. The grade does not need to be determined before the signature
collecting procedure. In other words, the scheme allows the user to recombine the
new signatures collected from new signers to the graded signature he holds, and to
produce a graded signature on the same message with higher grade. In the chapter 5,
we give the formal definition of the primitive and discuss the security requirements:
unforgeability and anonymity. We carefully compare our graded signature with the
existing related primitives. Also, we present an efficient construction that achieves
constant size secret key and public key. Furthermore, we manage to obtain linear size
graded signatures using recent results in efficient range proofs [26].
We consider the notion of “grade” as a general concept, and search its feasibility
for other primitives. Within this concept, we study the primitive “graded encryp-
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tion” as an extension of identity-based encryption to the graded settings. In graded
encryption, there will be a number of authorities corresponding to fixed indices. Each
authority here holds a master secret key to be used to issue a partial key to the users.
The primitive allows one to set a grade for a ciphertext in the encryption process
according to the significance of the message. The receiver of the ciphertext can only
decrypt it if he possess a secret key with same grade. The grade here determines the
number of different partial keys (= the number of distinct authorities) the receiver
must collect from the authorities in sequential order. We also emphasize some security requirements for graded encryption such that a secret key with a certain grade
would not be helpful in decrypting a ciphertext with higher grade. In this sense, the
primitive guarantees that the content of a ciphertext with grade i will be secure even
if all authorities up to i except one have been corrupted. Also, we present an efficient
construction for graded encryption which enjoys constant-size secret keys and ciphertexts. We also extend it to a two-mode version which is suitable for the application
of the game “who wants to be a millionaire?”. In a two-mode graded encryption
scheme, there are two types of secret keys: type-1 secret key is used to decrypt a
ciphertext with same level, and cannot be upgraded; on the contrary, type-2 secret
key can be upgraded, but cannot be used to decrypt a ciphertext with same level.
We also promote the primitive with useful applications that we discuss in chapter 6
For systems with a large number of participants such as large scale privacypreserving petitions, a graded signature scheme with linear-size signatures will not be
an efficient tool in practice. Instead, a scheme in which the signature size is independent of the number of signers would be better. However, obtaining such scheme is a
challenging task. A trivial way could be to run an (i, n)-threshold signature scheme
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for each signing key of level i 2 . Although we achieve constant size signatures in
this trivial solution, the size of the secret key that each signer holds will be linear
in the number of levels since a constant size secret share is given to each signer for
the signing key of each level. It’s not practical since it requires each signer to hold
a linear-size secret key. However, if we find an efficient way to share n signing keys
among the signers, we could get a practical graded signature scheme by utilizing a
threshold signature scheme. Thus, we now consider the problem of distributing n
secrets s1 , ..., sn among n parties in a way that; (i) each secret si can be constructed
from at least i corresponding shares, and (ii) the size of the share that each party
holds is much smaller than linear-size. This can be viewed as a variant of multi-secret
sharing scheme, and we call it “graded secret sharing”.
In a multi-secret sharing scheme (MSSS), n secrets s1 , ..., sn with the threshold
values t1 , ..., tn are distributed among parties in a way that any ti parties can recover
the corresponding secret si , but fewer than ti parties get no information about it.
Blundo et al. [13] showed that in order to achieve unconditional security in MSSS,
the size of the share that each party holds must be at least linear in the number of
secrets. We cannot hope better than this for unconditional security. Thus, we turn
our attention to computationally secure MSSS. Krawczyk [66] presented a method to
obtain more efficient (t, n)-threshold secret sharing in computational settings. Briefly,
the secret is encrypted using a much smaller secret key before the distribution. The
ciphertext is shared among parties using an information dispersal scheme [78], and
the secret key is distributed using Shamir secret sharing. If the secret key is λ bits
long, then the final share size for each user will be m/t + λ where m is the size of the
2

In a (k, n)-threshold signature scheme, the signing key is distributed among n signers in a way
that at least k of them should participate to form a signature, i.e. less then k signers can not create
a valid signature.

6
ciphertext.
Krawczyk’s construction can easily be adapted to multi-secret sharing by running
it n times. Each secret is encrypted under a different secret key. Then the ciphertexts
will be distributed using an information dispersal scheme, and the secret keys will be
P
shared using Shamir secret sharing. Thus, the size of each share becomes ni=1 m/ti +
nλ. As we discussed above, our goal here is to obtain smaller size for the share of
each party. If each user had only a single secret key, this might reduce the overhead.
So, we apply a special type of threshold encryption scheme, called dynamic threshold
public key encryption (DTPKE). However, obtaining a DTPKE scheme to achieve our
goal is also quite challenging. The only existing construction that enjoys constantsize ciphertext was proposed by Delerablee et al. [33]. The scheme contains O(n)
public group elements that are called combining keys, and all elements are required
in decrypting even a ciphertext with the threshold 1. Since all combining keys must be
given to each party, their scheme is not useful to get an efficient MSSS. Also, requiring
the combining keys seems to be inherent in the construction of DTPKE with small
size ciphertexts. To this aim, we propose a new DTPKE scheme with a threshold
range given in the public parameters. Our new construction uses a degree reduction
technique on the exponent and results in a combining key that scales linearly only in
the size of the given threshold range rather than the number of parties.
However, even if we use our new construction to apply Krawczyk’s idea, it will
yield a linear size share for each party. Instead of using it directly for all threshold
values in the range [1, n], we first split the range into log n parts. We then run an
independent DTPKE together with an information dispersal scheme for each part in
order to distribute the secrets that the associated thresholds fall in the corresponding
part. Thus, we get an efficient MSSS that achieves O(log n) size share for each party.
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We also show an interesting application of our MSSS in chapter 4.
Thesis Outline : In Chapter 2, we present notations and some cryptographic definitions and review some basic cryptographic primitives that will be useful in the following chapters. Chapter 3 presents a new flexible construction of dynamic threshold
public key encryption scheme (DTPKE) that enables us to obtain an efficient multisecret sharing scheme (MSSS). In Chapter 4, we first give a generic construction of
MSSS from DTPKE, then we present an efficient MSSS using the new construction
of DTPKE. In Chapter 5, we propose a new primitive that we call “graded signatures”, and present an efficient construction for the primitive. Chapter 6 introduces a
new primitive, “graded encryption” together with the useful applications of the new
primitive. Finally, in Chapter 7, we give the conclusion of the thesis.

Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we cover the notations and definitions to be used throughout the
thesis. We also review some cryptographic tools that will be helpful to comprehend
the following chapters. Readers that are familiar with the literature may skip this
chapter.
Notations. In the thesis, λ is used as the security parameter that specifies the
security level of the cryptographic systems. 1λ denotes the string of 1’s with length
λ. The abbreviation “PPT” is denoted probabilistic polynomial time algorithms. An
algorithm is called probabilistic polynomial time if it uses randomness and its running
time is bounded by some polynomial in the input size. Through the thesis, we use
the notion “negligible function” to evaluate the probability that an adversary can
break the security of a cryptographic scheme. The negligible function f is a function,
that for every possible integer c there exists an integer n0 such that for all x > n0
|f (x)| < 1/xc . We use the special symbol “⊥” as a possible output to indicate the
input is invalid. For a given set S, the symbol u ← S indicates that the element u is
8
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randomly chosen from the set S.

2.1

Bilinear Map

A bilinear map is a pairing that associates a pair of elements from the groups G1 ,
G2 with the element in the target group GT . Bilinear maps are useful tool to build
new cryptographic protocols (essentially for pairing-based cryptography), and we’ll
efficiently utilize them to obtain various new primitive through the thesis.
Let G1 , G2 , and GT be cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g and ḡ be the
generators of G1 , G2 , respectively. We say a map e : G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear map
if it satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity. For all a, b ∈ Zp and g1 ∈ G1 , g2 ∈ G2 , e(g1a , g2b ) = e(g1 , g2 )ab ,
• Non-degeneracy e(g, ḡ) 6= 1,
• Efficiency There exists an efficient algorithm [44] to compute e(g, h) for any
g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2 .
The bilinear pairing e for the bilinear group (p, G1 , G2 , GT , e) can be classified into
three types. If G1 = G2 , the pairing e is classified as type 1. If G1 6= G2 and there is
an efficiently computable homomorphism φ : G2 → G1 , the pairing is classified as type
2. As the last one, if G1 6= G2 and there is no efficiently computable homomorphism
between these groups, e is classified as type 3.

10

2.2

Complexity Assumptions

The security of the cryptographic primitives relies on the hardness of some cryptographic problems. We here review some of them that will be used through the
thesis.
Discrete Logarithm Problem. The problem was first proposed by Diffie and
Hellman [36] as hardness assumption for the cryptographic primitives. Since then,
many cryptosystems have been proposed whose security relies on this assumption.
The best known general purpose algorithm that solves the discrete logarithm problem
has sub-exponential running time in the security parameter.
Let G be a group of order q and g be a randomly chosen generator of G. The
discrete logarithm problem is defined as,

given g, h ∈ G, find an integer x such that h = g x .

We say that (t, )-discrete logarithm assumption holds in G if no t-time adversary
has advantage at least  in solving discrete logarithm problem.
Diffie-Hellman Problem. The problem was first presented by Diffie and Hellman
[36]. It’s still believed that computational Diffie-Hellman problem is as hard as the
discrete logarithm problem, but it’s still an open problem whether hardness of both
problems are equivalent.
Let G be a group of order q and g be a randomly chosen generator of G. The
computational Diffie-Hellman problem is defined as,

given g, g a , g b ∈ G, output g ab ∈ G.
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We say that (t, )-CDH assumption holds in G if no t-time adversary has advantage
at least  in solving computational Diffe-Hellman problem in G.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem. Let G, GT be two cyclic groups of order q, g
be a randomly chosen generator of G. Let e : G × G → GT be a bilinear map as
defined in the section 2.1. The computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem
is defined as,
given g, g a , g b , g c ∈ G, output e(g, g)abc ∈ GT .
Similarly, the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem is defined as,

given g, g a , g b , g c ∈ G, and Z ∈ GT , decide wether Z = e(g, g)abc ∈ GT or random in GT .

We say that (t, )-BDH assumption holds in G if no t-time adversary has advantage
at least  in solving computational Bilinear DIffe-Hellman problem in G. Also, we
say that (t, )-DBDH assumption holds in G if no t-time adversary has advantage at
least  in solving decisional Bilinear Diffe-Hellman problem in G.
The Multi-Sequence of Exponents Diffie-Hellman Problem. We here give the
cryptographic assumption that the security of our new construction for the dynamic
threshold public key encryption is based on. This assumption is essentially the same
as the assumption used in [33].
Let B = (p, G1 , G2 , GT , e) be a bilinear group systems, and `, n, and t be three
integers. Let g0 be a generator of G1 and h0 be a generator of G2 . Given two random
coprime polynomials f and g, of respective orders ` and t, with the roots y1 , . . . , y`
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and x1 , . . . , xt respectively, where xi 6= yj , and several sequence of exponentiations
g0 , g0γ , . . . , g0γ

`+n−1

g0α , g0α.γ , . . . , g α.γ
h, hγ , . . . , hγ

n−1

g k.γ.f (γ) ,

,

`+n−1

,

,

hα , hα.γ , . . . , hα.γ

n−1

,

hk.g(γ)

and also T ∈ GT , decide whether T is equal to e(g, h)k.f (γ) or some random element
of GT .
Delerablee et al. [33] justified the intractability of the assumption (`, n, t)-MSEDDH in the generic group model. As they point out, the assumption is non-interactive
and easily falsifiable.

2.3
2.3.1

Cryptographic Primitives
Commitment Schemes

A commitment scheme [43, 77] is a two phase-protocol that enables one to commit
to a value while keeping it as secret, and to reveal the committed value on demand.
The scheme is formed in a way that one cannot change the committed value after
committing to it (binding property), and the committed value is not revealed to the
receiver of the commitment (hiding property). Formally, a commitment scheme is
defined with three algorithms:

13
• Setup. The algorithm takes the security parameter λ and outputs the commitment key CK.
• Commit. The algorithm Com takes the value m to be committed and the
commitment key CK as inputs. It first picks a random value r as opening and
computes the commitment c = Com(CK, m, r). It then outputs the commitment c together with the opening value r.
• Opening. The algorithm Open takes the commitment c, the opening value d,
and the commitment key CK as inputs, and outputs the value m or ⊥.
A commitment scheme should satisfy two properties: the commitment gives no
information about the value to the receiver (hiding), and the sender cannot open the
commitment in two different ways (biding). Formally, these two features are defined
in the following way:
• (t − )-Hiding:

For every two values m, m0 , the distributions Com(CK, m, r)

and Com(CK, m0 , r) are (t, )-indistinguishable. In other words, with every
algorithm A of complexity less than t,

|P r[A(Com(CK, m, r)) = 1] − P r[A(Com(CK, m0 , r)) = 1]| ≤ 

• Perfectly Binding: For every value m and every two openings r and r0 ,

Open(CK, Com(CK, m, r), r0 ) = ⊥.
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2.3.2

Zero-Knowledge Protocols

A zero-knowledge proof [39, 49] allows one party (prover) to convince another party
(verifier) that a given statement is true without revealing any information other than
this fact. If the prover (or verifier) follows the protocol properly, we call it ’honest’;
otherwise we call it ’cheating’. A zero-knowledge proof must satisfy three properties:
(1) if the statement is true, the honest verifier will be convinced by an honest prover
(completeness), (2) if the statement is false, no cheating prover can convince the
honest verifier that it is true (soundness), (3) if the statement is true, the cheating
verifier learns nothing other than this fact (zero-knowledge). In this thesis, we deal
with the non-interactive variant of zero-knowledge protocols where the interaction is
not needed between prover and verifier. Note that Blum et al. [12] showed sharing
a common reference string among the parties is enough to achieve non-interactive
zero-knowledge.
Let R = {(x, w)} be an efficiently computational binary relation, where we call
x the statement and w the witness. Let L be the language which consists of the
statements from R. A non-interactive argument for a relation R consists of a key
generation algorithm G, which creates a common reference string crs, a prover P
and a verifier V . The prover generates a non-interactive argument π for an input
(crs, x, w). The verifier outputs 1 if the proof is valid; otherwise, outputs 0. Suppose
1 , 2 are negligible functions,
– A non-interactive argument (G, P, V ) is perfectly complete if:

Pr[crs ← G, ∀(x, w) ∈ R, V (crs, x, P (crs, x, w))] = 1.
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– We say (G, P, V ) is sound, if ∀A,

P r[crs ← G; (x, π) ← A(crs), x 6∈ L ∧ V (crs, x, π) = 1] ≤ .

– (G, P, V ) is zero knowledge, if there exists a simulator (S1 , S2 ) such that for all
non-uniform ppt adversaries A, ∀(x, w) ∈ R

| Pr[crs ← G, AP (crs,x,w) (crs) = 1] − P r[(crs, t) ← S1 , AS2 (crs,t,x) (crs) = 1]| < 

.

2.3.3

Range Proofs

Range proofs are zero-knowledge protocols that enable one to convince a verifier
that a committed value lies in a specific range. Range proofs are very useful tool
in designing various cryptographic schemes such as e-cash, electronic voting, and
anonymous credentials. Since Brickell et al. [19] presented the first efficient protocol
for the range proofs, there have been a lot of schemes [23, 26, 51, 67] proposed along
this line.
Boudot [19] utilized a well known properties of integers in order to get an efficient
range proof, i.e. every non-negative integers can be represented as sum of squares.
Lipmaa [67] later improved the method to obtain more efficient proofs such that
its complexity is independent of the secret size. However, it requires a group with
unknown order. Thus, this method is mostly useful when dealing with big secrets.
Bellare and Goldwasser [6] used the idea of the binary decomposition of the secret
in order to obtain a range proof for the interval [0, 2` ]. Lipmaa et al. [68] later
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gave a general solution for the ranges in the form [0, b]. Besides, Chaabouni et al.
[26] proposed a non-interactive zero-knowledge range proof using NIZK argument
presented by [52], which claimed that a range proof for a ∈ [0, H] can be constructed
P
if a = ni=1 Gi bi for some Gi and bi ∈ [0, u − 1] where (u − 1)a ∈ (u − 1).[0, H]. In
the chapter 5, we show how to use the non-interactive range proof given by [26] in
order to obtain an efficient graded signature scheme.

2.3.4

Digital Signatures

A digital signature is an authentication mechanism that enables a user to convince
a receiver for a message sent by the user, that the message indeed originated from
the user. In a digital signature scheme, every user holds a secret key-private key
pair. A user creates a signature on a message of his choice using his secret key, and
anyone having the user’s public key can verify that the signature was generated by the
user. Similar to hand-written signatures, digital signatures present two properties;
authenticity (a signature convinces a verifier that it was indeed generated by the owner
of the public key) and integrity (the signature wasn’t modified during transition).
The notion was first introduced by Diffie and Hellman in the seminal paper [36].
Later, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [79] proposed the first digital signature scheme
whose security is based on RSA assumption. Some other works in this line were also
proposed by [30,70,75,82]. In 1988, Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [50] introduced the
first rigorous formalization of the security of digital signatures. They also presented
the first signature scheme that is secure against an adaptive chosen-message attack.
Formally, a digital signature scheme is defined with three algorithms:
• Setup(λ) : The algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input, and outputs
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the secret key sk and the public key pk.
• Sign(m, sk) : The algorithm takes a message m and the secret key sk as inputs,
and outputs a signature σ on m.
• Verify(m, pk, σ) : The algorithm takes a signature σ, a message m, and the
public key pk as inputs. It either outputs accept or reject.
The correctness of the scheme requires that for a given public key pk and the
corresponding secret key sk, a signature σ on a message m output by Sign(m, sk) will
always be accepted by the verification algorithm. Formally, ∀m, and λ,

P r[(pk, sk) ← Setup(λ); σ ← Sign(m, sk) : reject ← Verify(m, pk, σ)] = 0

We here consider the standard security definition of digital signature scheme [50].
Intuitively, even if we allow an adversary to make signature queries on messages of
his choice, he still cannot forge a valid signature on a message not queried before.
Formally, existential unforgeability under chosen message attack is defined with the
following game:
• The challenger simulates the Setup algorithm and gets the parameters (pk, sk).
It then gives the public key mpk to the adversary.
• A is allowed to make a number of signature queries for the messages of his
choice. To respond the queries, the challenger simply runs the Sign algorithm
on those messages, and gives the corresponding signatures to the adversary.
• Finally, A outputs a signature σ ∗ together with a message m∗ , and wins the
game if the message m∗ was not queried before and Verify(m∗ , pk, σ ∗ ) = accept.
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ef −cma
The advantage of A is denoted with AdvA
. We say a signature scheme is

(t, q, )-existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack if for all tcpa
time adversaries A making at most q signature queries, AdvA
is at most .

2.3.5

Threshold Encryption Schemes

The notion was proposed by Desmedt and Frankel [35] as an extension of public
key encryption scheme. In a threshold encryption scheme, the secret key is shared
among n decryption servers so that at least t of them should present to correctly
decrypt any given ciphertext. In a (t, n)-threshold encryption scheme, there is an
entity, called the combiner, that wants to decrypt a ciphertext. When the combiner
receives a ciphertext C, he sends it to the decryption servers. The decryption servers
then use their secret key share to create the decryption shares, and give them back
to the combiner. If the combiner has collected at least t decryption shares, then
he combines them to get the plaintext. The security of the scheme guarantees that
less than t decryption shares does not reveal anything about the plaintext. We call
threshold encryption non-interactive [15, 91] if there is no interaction between the
decryption servers in the deception process, and we call threshold encryption scheme
robust [41, 46] if the combiner can identify when the decryption servers have given
invalid decryption shares. Both of them are desirable features for threshold encryption
schemes.
Formally , a threshold public key encryption scheme is defined as follows:
• Setup(t, n, λ) : The algorithm takes the number of servers n, the threshold value
t, and the security parameter λ as inputs. It outputs the public key pk and a
set of n secret key shares {sk1 , ..., skn } where each ski is associated to the server
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i.
• Encrypt(pk, m) : The algorithm takes the public key and a message m as inputs,
and outputs a ciphertext c.
• ShareDecrypt(pk, ski , c) : The algorithm takes the public key, a ciphertext c,
and a secret key share ski as inputs. It outputs a decryption share σi or ⊥.
• Combine(pk, c, {σ1 , ..., σt }) : The algorithm takes the public key, a ciphertext
c, and a set of decryption shares {σ1 , ..., σt } as inputs. It outputs a message m
or ⊥.
If c = Encrypt(pk, m) and S = {σ1 , ..., σt } is the set of t distinct decryption shares
where σi = ShareDecrypt(pk, ski , c), then the correctness of the scheme requires that
Combine(pk, c, S) = m.
There is one more algorithm for the robust threshold encryption schemes: ShareVerify, basically checks the validity of the decryption shares using the public key. For
such schemes, we also require that for any ciphertext c, if σ = ShareDecrpt(pk, ski , c),
then ShareVerify(pk, c, σ) = valid.
The intuition for the semantic security is that a bounded adversary who has corrupted less than t decryption servers cannot get any information about the plaintext.
Formally, the security of the scheme is defined with the following game between an
adversary and a challenger:
• The adversary A submits a threshold t.
• The challenger simulates the Setup algorithm and gets (pk, {sk1 , ..., skn }). It
then gives the public key pk to the adversary.
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• A is allowed to make corrupt queries. To respond the queries, the challenger
simply gives the corresponding secret key share ski to the adversary.
• A submits two messages m0 and m1 with the threshold t. The challenger
randomly choose b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends cb as an encryption of mb to A.
• A can adaptively make extra q 0 corrupt queries.
• Finally, A outputs a guess b0 and wins the game if b0 = b.
We require in the above game that q + q 0 < t. The advantage of A is defined
cpa
as AdvA
= | Pr[b0 = b] − 21 |. We say a threshold public key encryption scheme is
cpa
semantically secure if for any polynomial time adversary A the advantage AdvA
is

a negligible function over λ.

2.3.6

Identity Based Encryption

Identity-based encryption, proposed by [85], enables one to encrypt a message using
the receiver’s identity, without the need of the public key and the corresponding
certificate of the receiver. In IBE, there is a trusted authority that holds a master
secret key, and uses it to issue secret keys to the users based on their identities.
The primitive was introduced by Shamir [85] in 1984, however, the first construction for the notion could be achieved after nearly twenty years independently by
Boneh and Franklin [16] and Cocks [29]. The first proposed a scheme based on elliptic curve pairings, and the later proposed a scheme based on the quadratic residuosity
problem.
Formally, an identity-based encryption is defined as follows:
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• Setup(λ) : The algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input, and outputs
the master public key mpk and the master secret key msk for the private key
generator (PKG).
• Extract(msk, id) : The algorithm takes the master secret key msk and the
identity id of the user as inputs, and outputs the secret key skid for the user.
• Encrypt(mpk, id, m) : The algorithm takes the master public key mpk, the
identity id of the receiver, and a message m as inputs. It outputs a ciphertext
c.
• Decrypt(c, skid ) : The algorithm takes a ciphertext and the secret key skid as
inputs, and outputs a message m or ⊥.
The correctness of the scheme requires that ∀m : Decrypt(skid , c) where c =
Encrypt(mpk, id, m) and skid = Extract(msk, id).
We here consider the semantic security against passive adversaries for identitybased encryption schemes, which was first presented by Boneh and Franklin [16]. The
security of the scheme is defined with the following game between an adversary and
a challenger:
• The challenger simulates the Setup algorithm and gets the parameters (mpk, msk).
It then gives the master public key mpk to the adversary.
• A is allowed to make a number of secret key queries for the identities of his
choice. To respond the queries, the challenger simply runs the Extract algorithm
on those identities, and gives the corresponding secret keys to the adversary.
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• A submits two messages m0 and m1 together with the challenge identity id∗ .
Note that the adversary is not allowed to choose an identity for which he has
already requested a secret key, as challenge identity. The challenger then randomly choose b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends cb as an encryption of mb to A.
• A can adaptively make extra secret key queries.
• Finally, A outputs a guess b0 and wins the game if b0 = b.
cpa
The advantage of A is defined as AdvA
= | Pr[b0 = b] − 21 |. We say an identity-

based encryption scheme is (t, q, )-semantically secure if for all t-time adversaries A
cpa
making at most q secret key queries, AdvA
is at most .

We here briefly present the construction of the identity-based encryption scheme
given by Waters [90]. This construction is used as building block to obtain an efficient
graded encryption scheme that will be explained in the chapter 6. Waters proved
that the scheme is secure under the decisional BDH assumption. We leave the details
to [90].
Let G and GT be group of prime order p, g be the generator of G, and e : G×G →
GT be a bilinear map. The scheme is defined as follows:
• Setup(λ) : The algorithm choose a random integer α ∈ Zp . It also chooses
random group elements g2 , u0 , u1 , ..., un ∈ G. It sets the value g1 = g α and
outputs the public key as (g, g1 , g2 , u0 , {ui }) and the master secret key as g2α for
the private key generator (PKG).
• Extract(msk, id) : Let id be an n-bit string and I be the set of all i such that
idi = 1. PKG first chooses a random integer r ∈ Zp , then outputs the secret
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key of id as
skid = (g2α .(u0

Y

ui )r , g r ).

i∈I

• Encrypt(mpk, id, m) : The algorithm first chooses a random value t ∈ Zp , then
constructs the ciphertext for a message M as follows,

C = (e(g1 , g2 )t .M t , g t , (u0

Y

ui )t ).

i∈I

• Decrypt(c, skid ) : The ciphertext C = (C1 , C2 , C3 ) can be decrypted by skid =
(sk1 , sk2 ) as
C1 .

e(d2 , C3 )
.
e(d1 , C2 )

Chapter 3
Dynamic Threshold Public Key
Encryption
In a (t,n)-threshold public key encryption scheme, in order to remove the single point
of failure, the decryption key is distributed among a set of n users in such a way
that at least t of them should be present to successfully decrypt a ciphertext. In
such schemes, the encrypted message will still be secure even if less than t users are
corrupted. Threshold public key encryption schemes have extensively been studied
[15,24,32,35,60] and many applications such as electronic voting, electronic auctions,
key escrow, etc. have been considered in this context.
Regular threshold public key encryption schemes present some limitations: (i) the
authorized set is often determined during setup, and (ii) the threshold value t must be
fixed at the setup as a part of the public key, and cannot be changed at the encryption
time. On the other hand, in some applications the sender of the message may demand
some additional flexibility, i.e. for each ciphertext, setting different threshold value
or different set of receivers. With this motivation, Ghodosi et al. [60] formalize a
24
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new primitive, called Dynamic Threshold Cryptosystem, that enable the sender to
dynamically choose the threshold value t and the authorized set for each ciphertext.
They proposed a scheme based on RSA in which the length of the ciphertext is O(n)
where n is the number of receivers.
This problem also can be considered as an extension of broadcast encryption to
the threshold settings. Within this context, Chai et al. [27] presented an identitybased broadcast threshold decryption scheme in mobile ad hoc network. The scheme
enables a node to broadcast an encrypted message to dynamic groups so that only
the groups with enough nodes (more than threshold values) can get the message.
The scheme also enables the sender to set different threshold values for each group
in the target set; however, the length of the ciphertext is still linear in the number of
receiver nodes. Daza et al. [32] proposed two threshold encryption schemes (one for
PKI setting and one for identity-based setting) that achieves the ciphertext of size
n − t − O(1). They utilized some secret sharing techniques and the Canetti-HaleviKatz transformation [25] to achieve chosen ciphertext security and to shorten the
ciphertext size. Intuitively, the sender creates a set of (n − t) dummy users, and adds
the secret decryption information given by these users to the ciphertext. Thus, only
t other partial decryption values, given by the target set of receivers, will be enough
to correctly complete the decryption.
The primitive, however, was first formalized by Delerablee et al. [33]. They present
an efficient construction that is fully dynamic and secure in the standard model. Besides, it is the first one achieving constant-size ciphertexts. Intuitively, the construction employs an arbitrary bilinear map group system. Let e : G1 × G2 → GT be a
bilinear map, and g and h be two randomly selected generators for the groups G1 ,G2 ,
respectively. In the scheme, the encryption key EK consists of (2n + 2) group ele-
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i

i

α.γ
ments (u, v, {hα.γ }2n−1
∈ G2 , and v ∈ GT , and (n − 1) random
i=0 ) where u ∈ G1 , h

integers (d1 , ..., dn−1 ) from Zp 1 . In addition, the combining key includes (n−1) group
elements (h, hγ , ..., hγ

n−1

1

). Besides, the secret key of user j is g γ+j .

The encryption algorithm computes the header and the session key for a threshold
Q
t of users as (Hdr = (C1 = u−k , C2 = hkαP (γ) ), K = v k ) where P (γ) = nx=1 (γ + x) ·
Q
x∈D1 (γ + x), D1 ⊂ D, and |D1 | = t − 1. Note that for a threshold t, the algorithm
adds (t − 1) dummy users to fix the degree of the polynomial P (γ) as (n + t − 1).
Since the decryption procedure applies bilinear maps to C2 and usk, a collection of t
secret keys can be used collectively to reduce the degree of P (γ) by t as they will have
t different (γ + xi ) in the denominator of the exponent 2 . After that, the combining
i

key {hγ }n−2
i=0 will be enough to complete the decryption of the ciphertext. However,
with fewer than t secret keys, the polynomial in the exponent of the e(g, h) must have
n

degree no smaller than n. As it is impossible to reconstruct e(g, h)γ , the combining
key will not be sufficient to complete the decryption of the given ciphertext. This
works for any t, which is the core idea allowing a dynamic threshold.
An important feature of the scheme is that, all elements in the combining key are
used in decrypting even a ciphertext with the threshold 1. For some applications this
fact obstructs to utilize the primitive as an efficient building block. Besides, requiring
the combining key seems to be unavoidable in construction of dynamic threshold
public key encryption (DTPKE) with small size ciphertexts.
Our Results. We propose a new DTPKE scheme that has an allowed threshold
1

The integers (d1 , ..., dn−1 ) forms a set D of dummy users, which will be combined with the set
of users in order to be consistent with the threshold values.
2
The decryption procedure uses a special aggregate technique, which employs a simple fact that a
product of inverses of coprime polynomials can be written as a sum of inverses of affine polynomials.
For the detailed description, we refer the paper. [33]
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range in the public parameters. Knowing the threshold range, our new construction
uses a degree reduction technique on the exponent, and yields a combining key that
scales linearly only in the size of the threshold range rather than the number of all
users n 3 . This feature enables us to efficiently utilize the primitive in order to obtain
an multi-secret sharing scheme, that we’ll explain in the next chapter. Our scheme
also achieves constant size ciphertexts. However, in contrast to [33], it does not allow
the sender to dynamically choose the authorized set for each ciphertext; it fixes the
target set at the setup.

3.1

Definition of DTPKE

The notion of dynamic threshold public key encryption (DTPKE) was proposed in [33]
as a refinement of the regular threshold encryption scheme. In a DTPKE, each user
has a secret key, and a sender can specify a threshold t so that the ciphertext requires
t secret keys to jointly recover the plaintext. Moreover, the choice of threshold is not
fixed, but can be arbitrary based on the sender’s interests. Formally, a DTPKE is
defined with the following algorithms:
• D.Setup(λ): This algorithm takes a security parameter λ as input, and calculates a master secret key M K, an encryption key EK, and a combining key
CK. It then outputs the public parameters params = (EK, CK), and gives
M K to the registration authority.
3

Note that this change of having an allowed range is a strict generalization of the previous
definition of DTPKE rather than a weakening. To see this, we can simply set the allowed range to
be [1, n] to instantiate the previous scheme [33].
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• D.KeyGen(M K): This algorithm takes M K as input, and outputs the user’s
secret key uski and the user’s public key upki for each user i.
• D.Enc(EK, t, m): This algorithm takes the encryption key EK, a threshold t,
and a message M as inputs. It then outputs a ciphertext C.
• D.ShareDecrypt(uski , C): It takes the user’s secret key uski and a ciphertext
C as inputs, and outputs a decryption share σi .
• D.Combine(CK, T, σ1 , ..., σt , C):The algorithm takes the combining key CK, a
ciphertext C, a subset T of t user pubic key, and a list (σ1 , ..., σt ) of t decryption
shares as inputs. It either outputs a message M or ⊥.
Note that Delerablee et al. [33] counted two more algorithms ValidateCT and
VerifyShare as parts of usual DTPKE scheme. Since those algorithms can easily be
obtained using traditional techniques, we omitted them here.
Correctness: The correctness of a dynamic threshold public-key encryption scheme
requires that for any ciphertext C = D.Enc(EK, t, M ) with a threshold t, if t users
correctly produced the partial decryption shares σi , then the Combine algorithm on
the set {σ1 , ..., σt } correctly outputs the message M . Formally,

Pr[D.Combine(CK, T, {σi }i∈[t] , C) = M ] = 1

if C = D.Enc(EK, t, M ), and ∀i ∈ [t], σi = D.ShareDecrypt(uski , C)
Security: Briefly, the semantic security of the scheme guarantees that less than t users
cannot decrypt a ciphertext with the threshold t. Even if we allow an adversary to
corrupt t − 1 users, we claim that the content of the ciphertext with the threshold
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t will still be secure. Consider the following game between an adversary A and a
challenger C:
• The adversary A submits a threshold t.
• The challenger simulates the Setup algorithm and gets the system parameters
(M K, CK, EK). It then gives the public parameters params = (EK, CK) to
the adversary.
• A is allowed to make corrupt queries. To respond the queries, the challenger
runs D.KeyGen to get secret key-public key pairs and sends the corresponding
keys (upk1 , usk1 ), . . . , (upkq , uskq ) to A.
• A submits two messages M0 and M1 with the threshold t. The challenger
randomly choose b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends Cb as an encryption of Mb to A.
• A can adaptively make extra q 0 corrupt queries.
• Finally, A outputs a guess b0 and wins the game if b0 = b.
We require in the above game that q + q 0 < t. The advantage of A is defined as
cpa
AdvA
= | Pr[b0 = b] − 12 |. We say a dynamic threshold public key encryption scheme
cpa
is semantically secure if for any polynomial time adversary A the advantage AdvA

is a negligible function over λ.
Remark that the adversary can also make ShareDecrypt query, and get some decryption share of a ciphertext for some particular users. However, the corrupt queries
give more advantages in comparison to ShareDecrypt queries, and even we we allow
the adversary to corrupt up to t users in proving the security of the ciphertext with
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the threshold t. Thus, allowing only corrupt queries would be enough for the security
definition.

3.2

A New Construction of DTPKE

We here propose a new construction for DTPKE so that the combining (and encryption) key grows linearly in the range of the threshold t. The new scheme permits
senders to specify an arbitrary threshold for the ciphertext in a given range [δ0 , δ1 ),
and—as in [33]—, and achieves optimal size ciphertexts (a constant number of group
elements). Additionally, our scheme is algebraically simpler than the original scheme
of [33].
In more detail, the new scheme encodes the evaluation of a (δ1 − 1)-degree polynomial P (x) evaluating at a secret point γ into a secret key usk = g P (γ) . For a random
k, α, the encryption algorithm encodes the evaluation of a (t − δ0 )-degree polynomial
A(x) into a ciphertext C2 = hkαA(γ) . During decryption, pairing a secret key with
the ciphertext C2 would form a decryption share e(g, h)kαA(γ)P (γ) which will have the
evaluation of a (δ1 − δ0 + t − 1)-degree polynomial at γ in the exponent. The essential
point for correctness here is to remove the dependence between the decryption share
and the threshold t in their exponent. We observe that using simple linear algebra, t
users can find t coefficients to remove (t − 1) higher terms of P (x)A(x), arriving at a
polynomial with degree (δ1 − δ0 ); with one more small trick, we can bring it down to
δ1 − δ0 − 1. Thus, the combining key containing (δ1 − δ0 − 1) corresponding powers
will be enough to complete the decryption. While for the security, if there are not
enough decryption shares, there is always some leftover term in the exponent to mask
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the session key. Formally, given a threshold interval [δ0 , δ1 ), our DTPKE is as follows:
• Setup: The algorithm first chooses parameters defining a bilinear map system
for a given security parameter λ: B = (p, G1 , G2 , GT , e) where e : G1 × G2 → GT is
a bilinear map and |p| = λ. The algorithm then randomly chooses two integers
γ, α ∈ Zp∗ , and two generators g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2 . It outputs the master secret
i

1 −δ0 −1
key msk = (g, α, γ), the encryption key EK = (u, v, {hα.γ }δi=0
), and the
i

1 −δ0 −1
combining key CK = {hγ }δi=0
where u = g α.γ and v = e(g, h)α .

• KeyGen:(i, msk) The algorithm takes the master secret key msk as input. It
assigns an integer i ∈ Zp∗ to each user as his upk, and constructs the (δ1 − 1)degree polynomial Pi (x) = iδ1 −1 xδ1 −1 + ... + i2 x2 + ix + 1. It then outputs the
user’s key pairs as usk = g Pi (γ) and upk = i for all users.
• Enc(t, δ0 , δ1 , EK, M ): The algorithm takes as input the encryption key EK, a
threshold value t ∈ [δ0 , δ1 ), and a message M . It randomly chooses an integer
k ∈ Zp∗ and calculates the ciphertext C = (C1 , C2 , C3 ) as
C1 = u−k ,

C2 = hkαA(γ) ,

C3 = K · M,

where the polynomial A(x) = (x + 1) . . . (x + t − δ0 ) and K = v k is used as a
session key. Since A(·) is (t − δ0 )-degree polynomial, and t ∈ [δ0 , δ1 ), the second
component C2 = hkαA(γ) of the ciphertext can be computed from EK (see the
explanation below).
• ShareDecrypt(uski , C): The algorithm takes a ciphertext (C1 , C2 , C3 ) and
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secret key of a user as inputs. It computes the decryption share as

σi = e(uski , C2 ) = e(g, h)k.α·Pi (γ)·A(γ) .

• Combine(CK, {σi }), {upki }): This algorithm takes the set of decryption shares
{σ1 , . . . , σt } and the identities {1, . . . , t} as inputs (w.l.o.g, we assume that the
shares are from users 1, . . . , t, and the Pi (·) are defined using the coefficients
h1, i, i2 . . . , iδ1 −1 i for i ∈ [t]).
It first finds t values a1 , . . . , at , (not all zero) that satisfy

Pt

i=1

ai Pi (x) = Q(x),

where Q(x) has the (t − 1) higher degree term to be 0 (thus Q(x) is with degree
(δ1 − t)). This can be done by solving the following linear system:

    
δ1 −1
δ1 −1
1
2
·
·
·
t

 a1  0

    
1 2δ1 −2 · · · tδ1 −2  a2  0

    
.
 ×  .  = .
.
.
..
 ..
  ..   .. 
.
.
.
.
.

    

    
at
0
1 2δ1 −t+1 · · · tδ1 −t+1

It follows that:

Qt

ai
i=1 (σi )

= e(g, h)k.α·A(γ)·

Pt

i=1

ai P i(γ)

, and it is equal to e(g, h)kα·Q(γ)A(γ)

for a (δ1 − δ0 )-degree polynomial Q(x)A(x).
We further define:

R(x) =

(3.2.1)

X
Q(x) · A(x) − H
, where H =
ai · (t − δ0 )!
x
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In one formula, the combine algorithm then extracts the key as:

R(γ)

K = [e(C1 , h
= [e(g

−kαγ

)

t
Y

σiai ]1/H

i=1
R(γ)

,h

)e(g, h)kαQ(γ)·A(γ) ]1/H

= e(g, h)kα[Q(γ)A(γ)−γR(γ)]/H
= e(g, h)kα

(All the above value can be computed from public values and see more details
below about correctness).
Finally, it outputs C3 /K as the plaintext.
Correctness: Note that all the coefficients of the polynomial A(x) are public and A(x)
is with degree t − δ0 < δ1 − δ0 , thus the ciphertext C2 = (hαA(λ) )k is computable from
the public values hα , hαγ , . . . , hαγ

δ1 −δ0 −1

contained in EK.

Furthermore, since the degree (δ1 − 1) polynomials {Pi (x)} are also public, the
equations for the linear system can be formed. Note that the matrix has rank (t − 1)
and there are t unknowns for the equations, from linear algebra, we can always find a
solution set for a1 , . . . , at . More importantly, the linear system aims at reducing the
P
degree of i ai Pi (x), i.e., to kill the higher degree terms, thus the resulting polynomial
Q(x) will have degree [δ1 − 1 − (t − 1)] = δ1 − t.
Finally, the polynomial R(x) =

Q(x)·A(x)−H
,
x

where H =

P

ai · (t − δ0 )! is the

constant term of Q(x)A(x), thus R(x) will have degree δ1 − δ0 − 1, and all the
coefficients are known (or defined by the values of ha1 , . . . , at i). It follows that hR(γ)
can be computed from the public values h, hγ , . . . , hγ
combining key.

δ1 −δ0 −1

that are contained in the
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Efficiency: We can see that the construction has secret key and ciphertext both given
by a constant number of group elements; the encryption key and combining key size
grow linearly in the size of the range where the thresholds fall.
Security: We first briefly explain the intuition for the security. In the KeyGen algorithm, the rows of Vandermonde matrix are used as the coefficients for generating the
polynomial Pi (x) in the secret keys. Since any square sub-matrix of the Vandermonde
matrix has full rank, the system (1) with t equations will have only one solution (in
which all ai are zero). However, the system (1) with at most (t − 1) equations and
t coefficients ai will have many solutions—one will be nonzero. Thus, when t < δ1 ,
t users can decrease the degree on the exponent of the decryption shares by at most
t − 1. When the ciphertext is assigned threshold t0 > t, the leftover degree (on the
exponent hiding K) will be larger than δ1 − δ0 , which can not be computed from CK
(otherwise, it means the adversary can reduce degrees on exponent and violates the
underlying assumption).
Theorem 1. The dynamic threshold public key encryption scheme given above is
IND-CPA secure under MSE-DDH assumption.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A that breaks the security of DTPKE, then
we claim that we build a simulator S that breaks the security of the assumption
MSE-DDH. The algorithm S interacts with the adversary A as follows:
• A first submits a threshold t∗ . The simulator then gives the parameters ` =
(δ1 − δ0 ), n = δ1 , and t = (t∗ − δ0 ) to the challenger of the assumption MSEDDH, and gets an MSE-DDH instance. So, the simulator has two coprime
polynomials f and g with the degree (δ1 − δ0 ) and (t∗ − δ0 ) respectively, and
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with their distinct roots y1 , . . . , y(δ1 −δ0 ) and z1 , . . . , z(t∗ −δ0 ) . S has also a sequence
of exponentiations

g0 , g0γ , . . . , g0γ

2.δ1 −δ0 −1

g0α , g0α.γ , . . . , g0α.γ
h0 , hγ0 , . . . , hγ0

2.δ1 −δ0 −1

δ1 −1

α.γ
hα0 , hα.γ
0 , . . . , h0

k.γ.f (γ)

,

g0

,

,

,

δ1 −1

,

k.g(γ)

h0

as well as T ∈ GT which is either equal to e(g0 , h0 )k.f (γ) or some random element
of GT .
• The simulator S first chooses (δ1 − t∗ − 1) random integers x0j where j ∈ [δ1 −
t∗ − 1], and sets the public values xi = zi for i ≤ (t∗ − δ0 ) and xt∗ −δ0 +i =
f (γ)

x0i . It then sets g = g0

and h = h0 , and gives the encryption key EK =

i

i

δ1 −δ0 −1
1 −δ0 −1
1 −δ0 −1
(u, v, {hα.γ }δi=0
, {xj }δj=0
) and the combining key CK = ({hγ }i=0
)

where u = g α.γ and v = e(g, h)α to the adversary. Note that the simulator can
compute u and v from the given instance.
• When the adversary makes a corrupt query for a user with the identity id,
the simulator first picks a random integer i ∈ [n], and gives the corresponding
secret key uski = g Pi (γ) and public key upki = i to the adversary. Note that
since Pi (x) = iδ1 −1 .xδ1 −1 + ... + i2 .x2 + i.x + 1 is an (δ1 − 1)-degree polynomial,
f (γ).Pi (γ)

the secret key uski = g0

can be computed from the given instance.

• The adversary submits two messages M0 , M1 . The simulator chooses a bit
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b ∈ {0, 1}, and sets the ciphertext Cb = (C1 , C2 , C3 ) as
−k.γ.f (γ)

Cb = (g0

k.g(γ)

, h0

, T · Mb )

and returns Cb to A. It can be easily proved that if we set k 0 = k/α, then
0

C1 = u−k ,

0

C2 = hk .α.g(γ) .

• The adversary outputs a guess b0 and the simulator gives b0 to the challenger.
DT P KE
Assume AdvA
is the advantage of A in breaking the security of the con-

struction, and AdvSM SE−DDH is the advantage of S in breaking the security of the
assumption. If T = e(g0 , h0 )k.f (γ) , then A’ s view will be identical to a real attack.
DT P KE
= | Pr[b0 = b] − 1/2| > . However, if T is just random group
Thus AdvA

element, then Pr[b0 = b] = 1/2. Therefore

AdvSM SE−DDH ≥|

1
1
±  − |= .
2
2

Chapter 4
Graded Secret Sharing
Many cryptographic systems rely on a trusted authority that maintains and employs
a secret to carry out basic tasks such as encryption, decryption, or key generation.
Reliance on a single authority, however, raises immediate security and reliability
concerns. Secret-sharing schemes can be used to overcome these obstacles. Given a
set of n parties and a collection A of subsets of the parties, a secret sharing scheme for
A is a method of distributing shares of a secret among the parties so that any subset
of parties from A can reconstruct the secret, but any subset of parties which is not in
A cannot. It was introduced by Blakley [10] and Shamir [80] for threshold structures:
in such “threshold schemes,” any subset of the parties can recover the secret precisely
when the cardinality of that particular subset is above a certain threshold. Ito et
al. [71] later generalized the notion to more general access structures A.
A fundamental efficiency concern for secret sharing schemes is the size of the
share that must be distributed to each participant. Karnin [64] showed that in any
unconditionally secure secret sharing scheme, the length of each share must be at least
37
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that of the secret. To achieve better efficiency, Krawczyk [66] relaxed the security
guarantee by introducing a natural computational notion: while t shares can be used
to efficiently recover the secret, any fewer than t give no information about the secret
to a computationally bounded adversary. Each share in the scheme has size (m/t + λ)
where λ is the security parameter and m the size of the secret to be shared.
An important and well-studied variant arises when multiple secrets must be distributed to the parties [5,13,62,87,89]; such schemes are known as multi-secret sharing
schemes (MSSS). In a (t1 , . . . , t` )-multi-secret sharing scheme (MSSS), ` independent
secrets s1 , . . . , s` are shared with n parties in such a way that at least ti parties are
required to recover the secret si . For simplicity, we will assume ` ≤ n throughout the
paper, and sometimes we use them interchangeably.
Blundo et al. [13] established that in order to achieve unconditional security for
multi-secret threshold schemes, the size of the share that each participant holds must
be, at least, linear in the number of secrets. Besides, Masucci [73] presented a weaker
notion of security for multi-secret sharing schemes in unconditional settings, and
gave some lower bounds for the size of the shares of each participant. Herranz et
al. [56] proved that the size of the share for each participant in multi-secret threshold
schemes must be linear in the number of secrets, even if the scheme enjoys the weaker
unconditional security introduced by [73].
Motivated by Krawczyk’s success in the single secret case, computationally secure MSSSs are considered for better efficiency [55, 56]. However, straightforward
application of Krawczyk’s scheme [66] for a MSSS still incurs a linear size share for
each player, e.g., in [55], ` instances of [66] are run and the resulting share size is
m( t11 + . . . +

1
)
t`

+ `λ (if there are ` secrets). The first part is inherent due to the

message, while the second part as overhead grows linear in number of secrets. Her-
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ranz et al. [56] further observe that in the computational setting, one can shift the
private storage to the public via encryption, i.e., each player encrypts his shares using
a “symmetric key encryption”, and he only has to store a short key. In particular, an
information theoretic MSSS can be used to generate the shares first, then the shares
are encrypted and stored to a “public bulletin board”.
Introducing such public bulletin board indeed dramatically reduces the private
storage, however, it is not preferable for several reasons: (i) some trusted third party
needs to be always online to provide such public bulletin board service1 while in many
applications of secret sharing scheme, the system is decentralized and no such service
might be available, (for instance, our application to secure multiparty computation
in section 4.4) (ii) the public storage for each player is as large as in the information
theoretic case, (` · m for each player at least [56]) thus despite the small amount of
private storage needed it is still open to achieve small storage per player overall (both
public and private)2 .
Our Results.
We present a new construction for threshold MSSS (we here focus entirely on
threshold MSSSs, so we drop the adjective “threshold”) that achieves share size
O(m( t11 + . . . +

1
)
t`

+ log ` · λ) which is close to optimal when ` is large and does

not require any “public data”. As the first part is inherent for carrying the information of the message, the second part is the overhead that we try to minimize. A very
1

The need for such storage should be distinguished from the need for public parameters, e.g., the
description of an algebraic group. The public parameter can be set up once and distributed to every
party without augmenting the share size (since such parameters are very short).
2
One may wonder whether simply applying the tool of information dispersal (IDS) on the data
stored in the public bulletin board solves the problem, however, doing so is highly non-trivial. As
we will show later, in order to make the IDS effective, we first need to carefully design the scheme
so that the public bulletin board size scales only linear with each threshold, not always ` as in [56].

40
natural parameter choice which we will use for the application to secure multiparty
computation (MPC), we consider a (1, 2, . . . , `)−MSS. In such a scheme, the total
share size for each user is O(m(1 + 21 + . . . + 1` ) + log ` · λ) = O(log ` · (m + λ)).
We proceed in two steps: we first give a natural, generic construction of a (threshold) multi-secret sharing scheme from a dynamic threshold public key encryption
scheme (DTPKE). (The detailed definition of this primitive is described in the chapter
3); we then give a recursive adaptation of the construction using the new construction
of DTPKE (that we explained in the previous chapter), that yields a new MSSS with
nearly optimal share size in the case that the number of secrets to be distributed is
large.
The generic construction. As in [66], we use an encryption scheme as a building
block. To capture the various threshold requirements, we rely on a dynamic threshold
public key encryption scheme (DTPKE) [33] which enables a sender to dynamically
set a threshold value for the ciphertext for the decryption capability among the users.
Intuitively, given the secrets (s1 , .., s` ), we apply a DTPKE scheme to encrypt each
secret si with its threshold ti ; thus, the resulting ciphertext ci requires at least ti users
in order to be decrypted. Then, following [66], we apply an efficient information
dispersal scheme (IDS) [66, 78] to distribute the ciphertexts together with all the
public keys among users in a way that ti users can construct ci from their shares. This
yields a generic construction that transforms a DTPKE scheme into an MSSS. The
resulting construction is computationally secure if the given DTPKE is semantically
secure.
Recursive application of the generic construction. As we emphasized above,
we here aim to get an efficient MSSS that does not require any public data. So, we
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need to distribute all public parameters among the participants, even the combining
key that the DTPKE schemes possess. On the other hand, since all components of
the combining key are required in decrypting even a ciphertext with threshold 1, all
combining key should be given to each participant. It is clear that, even with our new
construction of DTPKE, applying our general reduction straightforwardly results in
a linear size share for each participant. To circumvent this obstacle, we divide the
threshold range into log n parts: ∆1 , . . . , ∆log n , where ∆u = [2u−1 , 2u ), (W.l.o.g, we
assume n is a power of 2). We then run an independent DTPKE instances together
with an IDS for each part ∆u in order to share the secrets {si |ti ∈ ∆u }. For each
window ∆u , there are at most 2u elements for the combining key, while the minimum
threshold for this range is 2u−1 , thus we can now apply the information dispersal
scheme [66, 78] to efficiently distribute the combining key, i.e., each share with size
O(1). Since n = poly(`), the final share size is O(log `), where ` is the number of
secrets.

4.1

Definition

In this section, we give the definition and the security requirements of the multisecret threshold schemes. We here formalize (t1 , . . . , t` )-multi-secret threshold sharing
scheme such that each ti is the threshold value for the corresponding secret si , and
ti ∈ [n] where n is the number of users. However, we consider (1, . . . , n)-MSSS, which
we call graded secret sharing, for the application of secure multiparty computation
(MPC) that we discuss at the end of this chapter.
Definition 1. A (t1 , . . . , t` )-multi-secret threshold sharing scheme is defined by two
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protocols as follows:
• Share: This protocol takes the security parameter λ, the set of n players P,
−
the global secret →
s = (s1 , ..., s` ) to be shared, and ` threshold values (t1 , ..., t` )
where ti ∈ [n]. It outputs the set of shares {shi }Pi ∈P .
• Reconstruct: This is a protocol executed among a subset of users: each user i
takes the index j ∈ [`] and his secret share shj as input, and they jointly output
the corresponding secret sj or ⊥.
Remark that the share protocol also outputs some public parameters required for
the reconstruct protocol (such as description of the underlying group system). Since
we consider them as part of share for each user, we didn’t specify them as separate
output.
A multi-secret sharing scheme has to satisfy the following two properties:
Correctness: Enough shares are able to reconstruct the secret. Formally, if S =
j
−
{shik }k=1
⊆ {shi }Pi ∈P where Share(λ, P, →
s , {ti }) = ({shi }Pi ∈P ), then

t

t

j
sj ← Reconstruct(j, {shik }k=1
).

However, if |S| < tj , then Reconstruct(j, S) = ⊥.
Security: We define the computational security of a multi-secret threshold sharing
scheme similar to the regular security notion of semantic security that is used in
encryption schemes. Consider the following game between a challenger C and an
adversary A.
• The challenger gives the set P of users and the thresholds values (t1 , ..., t` ) to
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the adversary.
• The adversary A submits the challenge threshold ti .
−
−
−
−
• The adversary also submits two global secrets →
s (0) , →
s (1) where →
s (0) 6= →
s (1)
(0)

(1)

and sj = sj , ∀j 6= i.
−
−
For simplicity, we require the adversary to submit two global secrets →
s (0) , →
s (1)
such that they differ only at the index i. It can be easily seen to imply the
general case.
• The challenger chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and runs the share protocol
−
({shk }Pk ∈P , params) ← Share(→
s (b) , P, {tk }, λ), and gives ({shk }k<ti , params)
to the adversary.
• Finally, A outputs a guess b0 .
The advantage of the adversary in breaking the security of the scheme is determined as
M SSS
AdvA
= |P r[b0 = b] − 1/2|.

M SSS
We say that the scheme is computationally secure if AdvA
is negligible.

4.2

Generic Construction of Computational Multisecret Sharing Schemes

To circumvent the lower bound restriction in the perfect secret sharing scheme [64],
Krawczyk [66] proposed a computational (t, n)-secret sharing for one secret. Specif-
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ically, after encrypting the secret, the ciphertext is distributed via an information
dispersal scheme to the users, while a regular Shamir secret sharing scheme is applied
to distribute the secret key. It can achieve essentially optimal share size: m/t, where
m is the size of the data to be shared and t is the threshold. As a secret key is only λ
bits long, the final share size for each user is only m/t + λ. This beautiful framework
inspires us to consider the efficiency benefits of a computational notion of security in
the setting of multi-secret sharing as well.
A natural way to generalize Krawczyk’s idea to multi-secret sharing (assuming
there are ` independent secrets to share) is to run the Krawczyk scheme ` times.
Each message can be encrypted under a different key, and the ciphertexts will be
dispersed as in [66]; ` independent Shamir secret sharing schemes are then carried out
P
P
to distribute the keys. Thus the total size will be `i=1 (mi /ti + λ) = `i=1 mi /ti + `λ.
This strategy was observed in [55] and analyzed there in detail. As discussed above,
our goal is to construct a multi-secret sharing scheme with sub-linear overhead in the
number of secrets, that does not require a “bulletin board”.
It seems that the above strategy inherently requires overhead linear in `, as each
message and secret key are treated independently. We need to deviate from this
natural construction and generalize Krawczyk’s idea in a more elaborate way. Observe
that if each user had only one single secret key, this might alleviate the overhead. To
realize this plan, we apply a special type of (threshold) encryption scheme so that the
ciphertext can be created with flexible thresholds while each user has only a single
secret key.
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4.2.1

Constructing MSSS from DTPKE

We now show how to use the DTPKE to construct a MSSS that provides computational security. This generic construction will be a stepping stone for our final efficient
construction and will permit us to treat the security analysis in a modular fashion.
First, consider an intermediate case where there is a bulletin board through which
all data can be accessed by any user. Assume there are ` secrets s1 , ..., s` to be shared
with corresponding thresholds t1 , ..., t` . These secrets can simply be encrypted using
the DTPKE with the corresponding thresholds, and the resulting ciphertexts—along
with the combining keys—can be placed on the bulletin board. In addition, each user
is given a secret key as a share. To reconstruct the secret si , ti users jointly decrypt
the corresponding ciphertext and get the plaintext as the secret si . However, we aim
to obtain an efficient scheme that does not include a bulletin board. So, we need to
distribute the bulletin board among users. The ciphertexts can be distributed via an
IDS without affecting the security. But all the combining keys are required to be able
to decrypt even a ciphertext with the threshold 1. Thus, all of them should be given
to each user.
Formally, given an information dispersal algorithm IDS, and a DTPKE scheme
D=( D.Setup, D.KeyGen, D.Enc, D.ShareDecrypt, D.Combine), a multisecret threshold sharing scheme can be obtained as follows:
• Share: The algorithm takes the security parameter λ, the set of users P =
{1, . . . , n}, the secrets s1 , ..., sl to be distributed, and the threshold values
{ti }i∈[`] . It first calls D.Setup(λ) to get the parameters (M K, EK, CK).
It then runs D.KeyGen algorithm to get the secret keys and the public keys
{upkj , uskj }j=1,...,n for the users.
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The algorithm then encrypts each secret and computes ci = D.Enc(EK, ti , si )
for the secrets si using its threshold ti .
Next, the algorithm distributes each ci by running an IDS on it using threshold
ti . Suppose the shares are {ci,j }i∈[`],j∈[n] .
This algorithm ends with each user j receiving his key pair (uskj , upkj ), the
combining key CK, and ` shares (c1,j , ..., c`,j ) for ciphertexts.
• Reconstruct: Assume there is a set S of users that jointly run the protocol in order to get the corresponding secret sk , and each user holds a share
(uskj , upkj , CK, {ci,j }) where j ∈ S, i ∈ [`], and |S| ≥ tk . They first jointly reconstruct ck using the IDS reconstruct algorithm on the shares {ck,j }j∈S . Then
each user in the set S runs D.ShareDecrypt on ck to get a decryption share
σk,j . Finally, they jointly compute the secret sk = D.Combine({σk,j }, ck , CK).
Remark. Regarding efficiency, each user’s share has size |CK| + |usk| + |upk| +
Pl
i=1 |ci,j |. In order to guarantee sub-linear size share, we need to find an efficient
IDS that results in sublinear size shares of ciphertexts. Besides, we demand a dynamic
threshold encryption scheme that, either the combining key of the scheme is constant,
or the structure of the scheme enables us to employ IDS on CK such that each share
size of CK will be at most sub-linear.
Correctness. First according to the IDS property, when |S| ≥ tk , ck can be recovered;
then following the correctness of the underlying DTPKE, |S| secret keys together
with the combing key can jointly decrypt sk .
Theorem 2. If D is a semantically secure DTPKE scheme, then the construction
given is a computationally secure MSSS.
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Proof. Assume there is an adversary that breaks the security of the multi-secret
threshold scheme; then we can build an algorithm B that breaks the security of the
scheme D. Consider the following game between the algorithm B and the adversary
A.
• B submits the set of users P and ` threshold values (t1 , . . . , t` ).
−
−
−
• A submits the threshold ti∗ and two global secrets →
s (0) , →
s (1) where →
s (0) and
→
−
s (1) differ only at the index i∗ .
• The algorithm B invokes the challenger of the scheme D in order to get the
public parameters (EK, CK).
B then makes corrupt queries for any q users, and gets q secret key-public key
pairs {uskj , upkj }qj=1 from the challenger.
(1)

(0)

B gives two secrets si∗ and si∗ together with the threshold value ti∗ to the
(b)

(b)

challenger, and receives the challenge ciphertext ci∗ of the secret si∗ .
B makes extra corrupt queries for any q 0 more users and gets q 0 secret key-public
0

0
key pairs {uskj , upkj }q+q
j=q+1 where q + q = ti∗ − 1.
(0)

B also computes the ciphertexts ci of the secrets si

for all i 6= i∗ ∈ [`]. It
(b)

then produces the shares {ci,j }i∈[`],Pj ∈P for the ciphertexts (c1 , . . . , ci∗ −1 , ci∗ ,
ci∗ +1 , . . . , cl ) by running IDS protocol.
Finally, B gives all (ti∗ − 1) shares {(uskjk , upkjk , CK, ci,jk )}i∈[`],k<ti∗ to the
adversary.
• The adversary A submits a guess b0 . The algorithm B gives this guess b0 to the
(b)

challenger of DTPKE as a guess for the challenge ciphertext ci∗ .
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M SSS
Assume AdvA
is the advantage of A in breaking the security of the construc-

tion, and AdvSDT P KE is the advantage of S in breaking the security of DTPKE. Since
M SSS
A’ s view will be identical to a real attack, if AdvA
> , then AdvSDT P KE ≥ .

Thus, we don’t have any security loss, and get very tight reduction.

4.3

Computational MSSS with Near Optimal Share
Size

With the new construction of DTPKE developed in the chapter 3, we can construct
an efficient multi-secret sharing scheme. Assume there are n users and ` secrets,
and n = poly(`). Intuitively, we group the secrets into log n classes according to
their threshold ranges, i.e., [1, 2),[2, 4), . . . , [n/2, n). For the secrets in the range of
[δ/2, δ), we will run an independent instance of our general construction of multi-secret
sharing, instantiating the underlying DTPKE with the new scheme we introduce in
section 3.2.
Note that the generic construction will be slightly altered: for each threshold range
[δ/2, δ), the combining key CK is dispersed using an IDS with threshold δ/2. Since
our new DTPKE for threshold range [δ/2, δ) has the combining key with the size
O(δ/2) (growing linearly with the size of the range instead of the largest threshold
value n), running an IDS on this CK will yield share size O(δ/2)/(δ/2) = O(1).
Thus, we will have final share size |C|(1/t1 + 1/t2 + . . . + 1/t` ) + O(log n) where
|C| is the ciphertext size of each message and t1 , . . . , t` are the thresholds for each
secret, respectively. The first term is essentially the smallest size corresponding to
the amount of information in the secrets, and the second part is the overhead we are
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aiming to minimize in this paper.
Given an efficient IDS (IDA.Disperse, IDA.Rec), and our new DTPKE, PD =
hPD.Setup, PD.KeyGen, PD.Enc, PD.ShareDecrypt, PD.Combinei, the details
of our final construction of multi-secret sharing are presented as follows:
• Share: The algorithm takes the security parameter λ, the set P of n users,
and the secrets s1 , . . . , s` to be distributed as inputs. It first groups these
secrets into log n groups ∆1 , . . . , ∆log n , according to the threshold values, where
∆u := [2u−1 , 2u ) for u = 1, . . . , log n. Here si with threshold ti belongs to ∆u
if ti ∈ ∆u . For each group ∆u , the algorithm runs PD.Setup(λ) to generate
parameters {(M Ku , EKu , CKu )}u=1,...,log n .
The algorithm then encrypts all the secrets using the corresponding master
public keys and thresholds to generate the ciphertext {c1 , . . . , c` }, where ci =
PD.Enc(EKu , ti , si ) if si is in group ∆u .
Now the algorithm runs the IDS on each ciphertext ci using thresholds ti , i.e.,
the shares of ci are generated as {ci,j }j=1,...,n ← IDA.Disperse(ci , ti ).
It also runs the IDS on each combining key CKu using threshold 2u−1 and gets
the shares {CKu,j }j=1,...,n .
For each user j, the algorithm runs PD.KeyGen on each range of thresholds
to generate key pairs (upkj,u , uskj,u ) ← PD.KeyGen(M Ku , j) for j = 1, . . . , n.
Also, it distributes the corresponding shares of ciphertexts and combining keys
to this user.
This algorithm ends with each user receiving his shares of ciphertexts {ci,j }i=1,...,` ,
his shares of CK {CKu,j }u=1,...,log n , and his key pairs {(upkj,u , uskj,u )}u=1,...,log n .
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• Reconstruct: A set S of tk users jointly run this protocol. Each user j ∈ S
takes the index k and his share {(uskj,u , upkj,u ), CKu,j , ci,j }u∈[log n] as inputs.
The users first jointly run the IDA.Rec protocol to reconstruct the ciphertext ck and the combining key CKu (assuming tk ∈ [2u−1 , 2u )) that were
dispersed using thresholds tk , 2u−1 respectively, i.e., they jointly reconstruct
ck ← IDA.Rec({ck,j }j∈S ); and CKu ← IDA.Rec({CKu,j }j∈S ).
Next, each user j in the set S partially decrypts the ciphertext, i.e., σk,j ←
PD.ShareDecrypt(uskj,u , ck ) to get decryption share σk,j .
Finally, they jointly compute the secret sk ← PD.Combine({σk,j }j∈S , CKu , ck )
Each party outputs the secret sk .
Efficiency: As we discussed at the beginning of the section, for each secret si with
threshold ti , suppose ti ∈ [δ/2, δ) where δ = 2u−1 for some u ∈ [log n]. The ciphertext
ci corresponding to this secret will be dispersed using threshold ti which will have
size |C|/ti (using, e.g., Rabin IDS [78], where |C| is the ciphertext size), thus the
ciphertext shares together have size |C|/t1 + |C|/t2 + . . . + |C|/t` assuming all the
ciphertexts are the same length. Regarding the combining key shares, there are in
total log n combining keys, each with size |CKu | = O(2u ) which will be dispersed
using threshold 2u−1 ; thus each contributes O(1) to the share size and the total size
from combining keys is O(log n). Additionally, there are log n user secret keys with
constant size each; thus the size from this part is O(log n). Taking n = poly(`) into
consideration, each share size is bounded by
1
1
+ ... +
+ O(log `).
|C|
t1
t`
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Note that our ciphertexts have 2 more group elements than the plaintext, as we
consider the case that ` is large, this little overhead is subsumed by the dominating
terms. We conclude that our share size is O[m · ( t11 + . . . +

1
)
t`

+ log `]. Taking a

(1, 2, . . . , n)-MSSS as example, it has a total size at only O(log ` · m).
Correctness: This is very similar to the correctness of the generic construction, with
the only difference being that the combining keys are dispersed; however, as long as
there are enough shares, the combining key can be reconstructed trivially from the
IDS property.
Security: The only difference with the generic construction is that the combining keys
are also dispersed here. Note that, they are given out directly in the generic construction, thus the security is not influenced. Combining Theorem 2 and Theorem 1, we
conclude the section with the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Suppose λ is the security parameter, under the MSE-DH assumption,
there exists a computational secure (t1 , . . . , t` )-multi-secret sharing scheme distributing ` secrets with length m each, having share size at O(m·(1/(t1 +. . .+1/tn ))+log nλ).

4.4

An MPC Protocol with O(log n) Private States

A multi-party computation (MPC) protocol [48,92] allows a set of parties to securely
compute a function f in a distributed way while ensuring the privacy of the users’
input and the correctness of the output, in the presence of dishonest users. Besides
these basic correctness and privacy requirements, robustness (the honest parties learn
their output even some parties play maliciously), fairness (if the honest parties do
not learn their output, then the corrupted parties also cannot learn their output) are
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also demanding properties for MPC protocols. Goldreich et al. [48] constructed the
first general MPC protocols that can be either secure in the passive model even when
there is only one honest user, or secure in the active model under the condition of
honest majority. After this seminal work, most of the works on MPC focus on these
two settings individually.
In [61], Ishai et al. aimed to achieve the best of both and combined the two
protocols into one that enjoys full security (including all properties listed above) in
the presence of any number of passive corruptions and a minority of active corruptions.
Briefly, given the function f and the inputs of n parties x1 , ..., xn , the protocol first
computes y = f (x1 , ..., xn ). However, the protocol does not directly output y. Instead,
using a (n/2, n)-secret sharing scheme, the protocol outputs a sharing of y to each
party. However, when there is no honest majority, and the adversary aborts during
the reconstruction phase (at a moment when she might already has learnt y), the
fairness property can not be guaranteed.
Hirt et al. [57] circumvented the above restriction and provide a a dynamic tradeoff
between active and passive corruption, and their protocol has fairness even with
dishonest majority (although the robustness still requires a honest majority). They
introduce a new primitive as building block, called gradual verifiable secret sharing
(VSS), which enables the protocol to release the secret gradually in the reconstruction
phase. In this way, when the honest parties abort the protocol, the adversary could
only have learned some shares of the secret.
To be more specific, a gradual VSS is a secret sharing scheme in which instead of
the secret s, the random secrets s1 , . . . , sn are shared among users where s1 +. . .+sn =
s and each si is shared with threshold i.
3

3

In reconstruction protocol, the shares are

The shares are the outputs of a general MPC protocol by running [48] in the first phase. Note
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released one by one in decreasing order of thresholds. Briefly, for each i ∈ [n], each
user pj first opens the commitment of the share sij via broadcast. If at least (i + 1)
users correctly opened the commitments to the corresponding shares, then each user
can locally calculate the secret si . Otherwise, the protocol is aborted, and each user
outputs a set of corrupted users that did not correctly open the commitments. If
there is no abort, each user will get the secret s = s1 + . . . + sn at the end of the
protocol.
Remark that an abort at stage i prevents the adversary from learning si , . . . , s1
and thus the secret s. From this fact, the gradual VSS enables the protocol to preserve
as much secrecy as possible. Given a function f and a set of inputs (x1 , ..., xn ), the
protocol given by [57] first computes y = f (x1 , ..., xn ). It first splits y into (n − 1)
secrets yi . Similar to [61], instead of y, it just shares yi among users by employing
gradual secret sharing. If the users realize active corruption, they abort the protocol
and output the set of corrupted users. They repeat the protocol with the new set
of users that does not include the corrupted users in the previous execution. This
protocol overcomes the drawbacks that the Ishai’s protocol possess that we mentioned
above.
The gradual VSS can be seen as a (1, 2, . . . , n − 1)-MSSS that reconstructs the
secrets one by one in a decreasing order of the thresholds. However, to implement
gradual VSS they use (n−1) independent Shamir secret sharing schemes for each part
yi . Hence, the first phase of the protocol results in linear size shares for users (which
they have store as private states, and the size grows fast when number of players is
large) in the terms of the number users. However, our construction given in section
that even though the GMW protocol does not provide strong enough robustness or fairness, however,
malicious parties do not gain any advantage aborting in this phase as they only see shares.

54
5.2 can be used as gradual secret sharing to distribute the values s1 , . . . , sn−1 where
Pn−1
i=1 si = y = f (x1 , ..., xn ). Similarly, the protocol first runs the GMW protocol [48],
computes the output value s1 , . . . , sn−1 , and then all parties reconstruct the real secret
gradually.
The only task left after replacing the “trivial” secret sharing scheme with our
efficient MSSS is that we have to make it verifiable. In other words, the users should be
convinced that the shares output by the protocol are valid. Besides, they have to prove
the validity of their shares when they pool them to get the secrets si . Fortunately, it is
not hard to turn our construction to a verifiable one. In brief, in the Share protocol,
each user receives a secret key, ciphertext shares and combining key shares generated
by the IDS. For the verifiability, the dealer has to prove that the secret key is in the
form g Pi (γ) which can be done easily by checking some bilinear relation. The validity of
the shares can be inherited from a verifiable IDS [22] (or even a general zero-knowledge
proof can be carried out). While in the Reconstruct protocol, each user proves in
zero-knowledge that the decryption share is in the form of σ = e(g, h)kα·A(γ)·Pi (γ) which
could be done efficiently (e.g., σ-protocol type of ZK proof [84]). At last, each user
proves the validity of the shares of the ciphertexts and the combining keys. Note that
for verifiability, some extra communication is necessary, however, they are not belong
to the private states that each user has to store. For the details of each underlying
tools, we refer to the references [22, 40, 84].

Chapter 5
Graded Signatures
In a petition system, a group of participants would like to send a formal request
to an organization via a representative (petitioner) that helps them to express their
opinions about an issue. There are several important criteria that a petition system
has to satisfy: (1) the number of participants supporting the petition should be
indicated; (2) the participants may prefer to remain anonymous in many scenarios,
e.g., when these relate to political or religious issues; (3) the petitioner should not be
able to make a false claim that the claimed number of participants is more than their
actual number, e.g., duplicate participants should be removed without revealing any
identities etc.
To address the above problem, we introduce a new primitive, which we call graded
signature1 , that is applicable to an efficient privacy-preserving digital petition system.
In a graded signature scheme a user collects signatures from registered signers in a
PKI. The primitive enables the consolidation of an arbitrary number of signatures
1

It is actually quite surprising that many seemingly related notions exist, however none of them
satisfy all the natural requirements; we elaborate more on this below.
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(say l) originating from a subset of l distinct signers on the same message m. The
resulting signature object, σ (l) , convinces the verifier that at least l signers indeed
signed on m without revealing the identities of signers. We call l, the grade of the
signature. Note that l can range from 1 to n, where n is the total number of currently
registered signers in the PKI. There is no need to pre-determine the value of l before
the signature collecting procedure.
There exist many variants of PKI oriented signatures that provide anonymity,
e.g., ring signatures [81] is a prominent example. Moreover there are aggregate signatures [18] and threshold signatures [34, 86] which provide a form of a consolidation
operation aimed at combining signatures into a single object. In some sense, a graded
signature is a new primitive that brings together these lines of work. We will carefully
compare our graded signature with existing related primitives below.
In a ring signature [81], the signer can anonymously sign a message on behalf of
a group formed in an ad-hoc manner. Using our terminology, every ring signature
will have a fixed grade 1, i.e., one of the signers signed the message. To form a
graded signature with the grade k, for instance, the combiner can collect k ring
signature on the message from k different signers. However, a regular ring signature
scheme does not enable the receiver to check if there are two signatures produces
by the same signer, which we need in graded signatures. To this aim, the notion
of linkable ring signature [28, 69], that enables one to detect whether two signatures
were generated by the same signer, seems sufficient to get a graded signature scheme
at first glance. However, even if we use short ring signatures [3, 88], it still results in
quadratic verification time since the verifier should check every pair of signatures. On
the other hand, a (t, n)-threshold ring signature scheme [21] will convince the verifier
that t signers agree on the message without leaking their identities. Similar to ring
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signatures, any (t, n)-threshold ring signature will have a fixed grade t. While we
also require anonymity in a graded signature in a similar sense, in contrast to these
previous primitives, our graded signature should enable one to produce a signature,
with an arbitrary grade, solely depending on how many signers agree to sign on the
message; furthermore our constructions can even allow the grade to be upgraded if
the user can get more signatures from additional signers on the message.
Regarding our second application of delegation of signing rights, one may think of
proxy signature [14,72], in which a proxy can sign documents on behalf of the delegator
if it is granted the signing rights from the owner by running a delegation protocol.
Also, other variants of proxy signatures exist, e.g., anonymous proxy signature [42]
provides anonymity for the intermediate proxies if there is a chain of delegatees; and
threshold proxy signature [93] in which one key owner delegates his signing rights to
a bunch of proxies, but only when the total number of proxies is above the threshold,
a valid proxy signature can be produced. The notion of functional signatures was also
studied in [20]. It enables the key owner to delegate the signing rights according to a
fine-grained policy f , such that the delegatee can only sign messages in the range of
f . Our notion of graded signature is different than the above in the sense that there
are multiple key owners to delegate their signing rights to one “proxy”, so that the
“proxy signature” can be verified according to the number of delegators (its grade)
without leaking the delegators’ identities.kot
In a threshold signature scheme [34,86] and its distributive variants [31,77], when
the number of signers is below the threshold, they can not jointly produce a signature
that convinces the verifier. However, if the signers are above the threshold, the
signatures will look the same to the verifier. Although the signers may be allowed to
change [45], normally the value of the threshold needs to be fixed during the system
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setup. Furthermore, they either require a fully trusted dealer to distribute signing
keys, or when the number of signers is bigger than the threshold, they can recover
all the secret key data. In contrast to that, in a graded signature, each consolidated
signature is assigned a grade – the number of signers, and this number is not predetermined, and it can vary from 1 to the total number of the signers which is n. Also,
it can be deployed in a standard PKI setting without a trusted setup. No collusion of
signers is able to produce a signature with grade larger than the size of the collusion.
The closest to our work is the notion of signature of reputation [9], which focuses
only on the application of reputation systems and allows a user, as the combiner in our
scheme, to consolidate all the upvotes for him as his reputation. Their construction
is built on a general framework of NIZK proof systems that the user commits to each
upvote and prove in zero-knowledge that each of the commitment contains a valid
upvote. Note that a straigtforward application of such general framework would yield
a signature of reputation with size that grows at least quadratically to the number of
votes (even with the most efficient NIZK proof technique). The user has to provide
a NIZK proof for each pair of commitments that they are from different identities.
They resolve this problem via a clever use of the “linkability” of each commitment
that the same randomness is used across all commitments of the votes, and each
vote is essentially a unique signature. The verifier thus can check that each pair
of commitments contain different votes which must come from different identities.
However, this trick inherently incurs a quadratic (to the number of votes–grade in
our terminology) verification time. Instead of only focusing on the application of
reputation systems, our graded signature schemes aim at broader applications and
we consider the notion as a more fundamental cryptographic primitive. Furthermore,
since a signature might be verified many times, verification time is considered to
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be one of the most important efficiency metrics. Moreover, we want to remove the
restriction that only unique signature schemes can be used for graded signatures.
We propose a new way of using the general commit and prove framework in our
construction that brings down the verification time to linear while still keeps the
signature size linear to the grade, for a broader class of signature schemes.
Another closely related work is graded encryption [65], which is a generalization
of identity based encryption (IBE). The primitive enables the user to sequentially
upgrade the level of his key so that the secret key of an identity with level k can
decrypt all the ciphertexts sent for the identity with level k 0 ≤ k. Since IBE implies a
signature scheme a graded encryption scheme also implies a graded signature scheme
in the sense that the consolidation has to happen in a sequential fashion. While
our graded signature scheme does not have this restriction, the signatures can be
collected in an arbitrary order from signers. It would be an interesting open question
to consider graded encryption in the setting that the upgrading procedure is flexible
like in graded signatures, i.e., only depending on how many secret keys received.
Besides those privacy preserving signature schemes, multi-signatures [7], and more
generally, aggregate signatures [18] provide mechanisms for one to compactly represent signatures from different parties, some recent work [58] even shows that one may
aggregate any type of signature from obfuscation techniques [58, 83]. However, the
identities (public keys) of the signers will have to be explicitly given out for the verification. Contrary to that, a graded signature will keep the identities hidden, while
reveal to the verifier only the grade of the signature. One may wonder whether adding
some kind of anonymity to the signer to aggregate signatures will give us a graded signature. Specifically, if we have a trusted registration authority to issue certificates for
public keys in a way that the identities are not revealed, the anonymity of the signers
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will be achieved. However, graded signature schemes also require the distinctness of
the signers to be validated. Besides, according to the application scenarios e.g., that
of an anonymous petition, the definition of anonymity has to be very strong so that
even the registration authority (which might be the adversary in some settings) is
allowed to be corrupted. Actually this anonymity requirement is a crucial difference
between aggregate signatures and graded signatures that makes them incomparable.
On one hand, there is no clear mechanism from aggregate signatures that can provide
us strong anonymity together with the proof of distinctness of signers; on the other
hand, our strong anonymity precludes the possibility for the verifier to identify the
exact source of the signature.
Our Results.
We first introduce formal definitions for graded signatures, including their correctness and security properties: unforgeability and anonymity. Every signer has his
own key pair that is certified by the certificate authority. For correctness, when a
signature is consolidated from ` different signatures, the consolidator should be able
to convince the verifier that the signature is of grade `0 as long as ` ≥ `0 . This allows
us to define unforgeability focusing only at the attack scenario when the adversary
produces a signature with grade one more than she is supposed to be able to produce.
Regarding anonymity, we define it in a very strong sense: even if all parties, including
the signers and the certification authority, are corrupted the consolidated signature
should not leak the set of signers whose signatures were included in the consolidation
process.
We provide an efficient construction for graded signatures which achieves a constant verification and secret key size while both the graded signature size and the
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verification time are linear in the grade of the signature. This construction follows a
“commit and prove” approach. Note that simply committing the signatures and showing that they originate from certified signers is insufficient: this is subject to a trivial
attack where the consolidator uses the same signature over and over to increase the
grade. In order to prevent this attack, an assurance of signature distinctness should
be included in the proof that, if straightforwardly implemented, leads to a quadratic
size or verification overhead. We go around this by introducing an order among signer
public keys, and design the protocol in a way that it is compatible with the recent
results of very efficient range proofs that were developed in [26].Note that since each
signing key is independent, the verification key of each signer who contributes to the
graded signature should be somehow involved in the signature object generation in
order for the verification of the consolidated signature to take place correctly. Thus,
if we view graded signature with grade l as a “proof of knowledge” of l signatures
it follows that the length of the underlying consolidated signature must be at least
linear in l since it is supposed to carry information for l independent originating signers. Besides, this proof should also include an argument which shows that l distinct
certified signers were involved in its construction.

5.1

Definitions and Security Modeling

In a graded signature scheme, there is a set of signers who register their public key with
a certification authority, as in a traditional PKI setting, and there is a procedure which
enables a privacy preserving signature combining functionality. Specifically, from
several signatures on a message m originating from different signers, one can produce
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a “signature object” which convinces any verifier that at least “l distinct signers”
signed on the message m without leaking the identity of any of them (beyond that
they are members of the PKI of course). The grade l can vary from 1 to n where n is
the total number of the registered signers in the system. For the ease of presentation,
we differentiate the real grade ` which is the actual number of signatures used to
consolidate the graded signature and the claimed grade `0 which is sent together with
the graded signature for verification. Verfication algorithm will accept if `0 ≤ `. The
detailed definition of a graded signature is as follows:
• Setup: This algorithm takes the security parameter as an input, and outputs
a master key pair (gsk, gpk).
• Register: This algorithm takes the master secret key gsk, a signer verification
key vki as inputs and outputs a certificate certi = Sign(gsk, vki ||i) for the
registered signer. The index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} corresponds to a unique signer.
• Sign: This algorithm takes a key pair (ski , vki ) and a message m as inputs, and
outputs a signature σi on m.
• Combine: This algorithm takes as inputs the global public parameters gpk, a
message m and a set of signatures {σi1 , . . . , σil } on m from different signers and
a set of verification keys {vki1 , . . . , vkil } and the corresponding certifications
{certi1 , ..., certil }. It outputs a “consolidated” signature σ (`) and its real grade
`.
• Verify: This algorithm inputs the global public gpk, a message signature pair
(m, σ (`) ) and the claimed grade `0 of the signatur, and outputs 0 or 1.
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5.1.1

Security of Graded Signatures

The Correctness of a graded signature scheme requires that if ` valid signatures under
` different certified verification keys are used to produce the graded signature, then
as long as the claimed grade is no bigger than `, the verification should always output
1, i.e., if (m, σ (`) ) = Combine(m, {(vki , certi , σi )}i=i1 ,...,il ), and for each i, (m, σi )
is a valid message-signature pair under vki , and (vki , certi ) is valid under gpk, then
Verify(`0 , m, σ, gpk)=1 as long as `0 ≤ `.
There are two major security concerns in a graded signature, unforgeability and
anonymity. Unforgeability in this setting means one can not produce a graded signature with a higher grade (≥ `) than that she is supposed to be capable of, i.e.,
she may register new users, corrupt existing users, and receive some signatures on
a target message, but the numbers add up to at most ` − 1. For anonymity, we
require it in a very strong sense that any two graded signatures with a same grade
will look indistinguishable (even to the CA and the signers who contribute one of the
signatures ).
Unforgeability of Graded Signatures: In order to capture all the possible attacks that
the adversary A may try, we make explicit all kinds queries including registration
queries which ask the CA to certify some public keys provided by A, the corruption
queries which enables A to learn the secret key of known, certified public keys, and the
signature query for uncorrupted public keys. Consider the following game between
an adversary A and a challenger C.
• A receives the master public key gpk.
• A is allowed to make registration queries, and gets certifications for the public
keys that are generated by A.
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• A is also allowed to make corrupt queries, and gets secret keys for some existing
certifications. (Note that all existing certifications and public keys together with
the corresponding indices are available to the adversary)
• A also adaptively chooses messages to ask C for signing queries from signers
that are not queried for the secret key or the certification, and receives the
corresponding signatures on those messages.
• A outputs a message m∗ and signature with grade l.
A
be the advantage of A in the game under the condition
Definition 2. Let AdvGS

that A has asked at most l − 1 = q1 + q2 + q3 queries where q1 is the total number of
the secret key queries, q2 is the total number of the certification queries, and q3 is the
total number of signature queries for m∗ . We say the graded signature is existentially
A
≤ negl(λ).
unforgeable under adaptive corruption attack if AdvGS

Remark that in our definition of unforgeability, we did not explicitly consider the
attack that the adversary outputs a graded signature with ` + t for t > 0. However,
from our definition of correctness, it is straightforward that if adversary is able to do
so, she will be also capable of amounting an effective attack on our definition directly,
as a forged signature with grade ` + t is also a forged signature with grade `. We may
also consider weaker models such as selective corruption, and we omit the discussion
of details of these weaker variants.
Anonymity of Graded Signatures: We require a strong type of anonymity for a graded
signature: two graded signatures can not be distinguished with respect to any characteristic except their grade. In the anonymity definition, even the certification authority and signers will not be able to link two graded signatures for an adversarially
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chosen message with a same grade. Consider the following game between an adversary
A and a challenger C.
• A receives the master public key gpk.
• A makes queries for the secret keys of signers. Note that the adversary here is
allowed to corrupt all signers, even the certification authority.
• A also selects a grade l, a message m, and two sets of signers S0 , S1 with
size l such that S0 6= S1 . The adversary then produces two sets of tuples
D0 = {certi , σi , vki } and D1 = {certj , σj , vkj } where i ∈ S0 and j ∈ S1 . Thus,
A sends all sets S0 , S1 , D0 , D1 and message m together with l to C.2
• The challenger C randomly flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends A a graded signature σ (`) with grade l which is produced from l signatures on m from the set
Db .
• Finally, A output a guess b0 .
Definition 3. We say a graded signature is fully anonymous if the probability of
guessing the bit correctly is negligibly close to 21 , i.e., | Pr[b = b0 ] − 12 | ≤ , where  is
a negligible function.

5.2

Graded Signatures with Linear Signature Size
and Verification Time

In this section, we present an existentially unforgeable graded signature scheme with
both linear in the grade verification time and signature size. The construction relies
2

In order to simplify the game definition, we assume the sets S0 , S1 differ only by one index, i.e.,
S0 \ S1 = i0 and S1 \ S0 = i1 .
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on involved mechanisms that are compatible with a constant size NIZK range proof
together with a constant size NIZK proof of consistency of committed verification
and signatures.
In order to motivate our construction recall the following generic solution for a
graded signature: the user runs the aggregation algorithm of an aggregate signature
scheme (or multi-signature with non-interactive signing) on input vki1 , . . . , vkit , m, σ,
and commits to all the verification keys, and produces a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof for the following statements: 1. σ is an aggregate signature on m under the
committed verification keys; 2. all committed verification keys are certified; 3. each
of the committed verification keys are different. The straightforward way of proving
the third condition in zero-knowledge would be to prove that the verification-keys are
pairwise different. Even with the most efficient NIZK proof of inequality, this step
brings a cost at least quadratic in the grade of the signature (the number of signer
public keys) that we want to avoid. We may use SNARK [8]to construct efficient
graded signature schemes as the final proof size could be as short as poly(λ) where λ
is the security parameter. However, we aim to get an efficient graded signature without applying knowledge assumptions, thus we will focus on using standard building
blocks as Groth-Sahai proofs [53] below.
Besides, designing a linear size signature from standard assumptions was also the
main technical work of signature of reputation [9]. Unfortunately their technique inherently relies on certain kind of “linkability” among commitments and “uniqueness”
of the signature scheme. They incur quadratic verification time and restrict the class
of signature schemes that can be used to produce a graded signature.
We go around these problems by introducing a new technique that we assign an index from {1, ..., n} as a part of public key of the signer where n is the maximum level.
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We then utilize an efficient non-interactive range proof so that we can sort the indices
and sequentially prove a “larger than” statement to show that indices from which
the graded signature is produced are different. In this way we can bring down the
complexity from (at least) quadratic to linear. Specifically, when a signer registers his
verification key, the CA will choose an index for him and sign the index together with
his verification key to produce the certificate for that signer. After collecting signatures (m, vki1 , σi1 , certi1 ), . . . , (m, vkit , σit , certit ), the Combine algorithm commits
to all the verification keys, all the certificates, and all the corresponding signatures.
Then, the Combine algorithm will produce a proof that each committed signature is
valid under the corresponding committed verification key; second, a proof that each
certificate is valid under the public key of the certification authority; third, the algorithm will sort the indices of the verification-keys in a decreasing order and establish
that each index belongs to range [1, n]. Due to the additive homomorphic property
of the commitment scheme we use, the Combine algorithm will be also capable to
produce a proof that Com(ij − ij−1 ) is a commitment to an integer which also falls
in range [1, n]. So it follows that this value is bigger than 0, and hence the difference
of any two neighboring indices is strict. In this fashion the algorithm will establish
a proof showing that there are l valid signatures from l different certified signers on
m. This completes the high level overview of the construction. What remains is how
to get a constant size NIZK proof for each of the above statements. Thanks to the
flexibility of this construction methodology we can choose any appropriate signature
scheme as long as it can be paired with efficient NIZK proofs. We instantiate the
scheme using automorphic signatures [1] together with a Groth-Sahai proof of validity
of committed signatures [54], and also an efficient range proof of committed values.
In this way we can see that verification only has to do a sequential scanning instead
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of pair-wise comparison as in [9]; furthermore, the signarture size is still linear in the
grade as each component only cost a constant number of group elements.
Suppose we have two signature schemes Sig, Sig 0 , an additively homomorphic
commitment scheme Com. The scheme is formally presented as follows:
• Setup: The algorithm runs the key generation of Sig, and generates a key
pair (msk, mpk). It also generates global parameters param including the CRS
string for the commitment scheme and the NIZK proof system, and the total
number n of allowed signers in the system. It outputs the global key pair
(gsk, gpk) where gsk = msk, and gpk = (mpk, param).
• Register: This is a protocol between signer and CA. Signer first runs the key
generation of sig 0 to get his signing key pair (vk, sk), and submits vk to the CA.
The CA first checks whether this signer is already registered, if not, he chooses
an index i, runs the signing algorithm of Sig on (vk, i), and returns the signer
certi , where certi = Sig(msk, (vk, i)).
• Sign: This algorithm receives as input a signer’s secret key ski , a message m
and runs the Sig 0 algorithm to get a signature σi on m, and it outputs σi ,
signer’s index i and certi .
• Combine: This algorithm takes as inputs a message m, a sequence of signatures (σi1 , . . . , σil ) for the message m under vki1 , . . . , vkil with the corresponding
certificates (certi1 , . . . , certil ), from l different signers. It first checks the validity
of the signatures and the certificates, and determines the grade l. Suppose the
sequence is in a decreasing order according to the indices, i.e., i1 > i2 . . . > il . It
computes the commitments to all those values and gets c1ij = Com(σij ) for the
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signatures, c2ij = Com(vkij ) for the signers’ verification keys, c3ij = Com(certij )
for the certificates, and c4ij = Com(ij ) for the signers’ indices. Using the signatures as witnesses, it constructs 4l − 1 NIZK proofs. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , l},
the proof πi1j establishes that c1ij commits to a valid signature on m under the
verification key contained in c2ij ; πi2j proves that c3ij commits to a valid signature
under mpk on the message pair contained in c2ij and c4ij ; πi3j proves c4ij commits
to a value which belongs to {1, . . . , n}; πi4j proves that c4ij+1 /c4ij = Com(ij+1 −ij )
also commits to a value ranging in {1, . . . , n}. It outputs the message m and sig1
, πi2j , πi3j , πi4j }j=1,...,l , together with its grade
nature object as {c1i,j , c2ij , c3ij , c4ij , πi,j

l.
• Verify: The verifier takes global public key gpk, a message m, and a graded
1
, πi2j , πi3j , πi4j }j=1,...,l with grade l as inputs, it first
signature {c1i,j , c2ij , c3ij , c4ij , πi,j

parses the signature, and for j = 1, . . . , l, it checks the validity of the proofs
4
1
; if all checks
, πi2j , πi3j , and for j = 1, . . . , l − 1, it checks the validity of πi,j
πi,j

pass, it outputs 1, otherwise 0.
Correctness: The correctness of our scheme trivially follows the correctness of the
signature schemes Sig and Sig’, and the completeness of the NIZK proof systems.
Briefly, if the user has ` signatures (σij , vkij , certi,j ) for a message m collected from
different signers such that each σij is a valid signature on m under vkij , and each
certij is valid signature on (pkij , ij ) under mpk, and if the ` tuples (σij , vkij , certi,j )
are sorted in decreasing order, and all indices ij and all ij+1 −ij are in the range [1, n].
Then from the completeness of NIZK proof systems, the Verify algorithm accepts the

70
signature σ (`) on m constructed as

1
σ (`) = {c1i,j , c2ij , c3ij , c4ij , πi,j
, πi2j , πi3j , πi4j }j∈[`] = Combine(m, (σij , vkij , certij )j∈[l] ).

Security Analysis: Security follows quite easily from the properties of the zeroknowledge proofs and the commitment schemes. For unforgeability, suppose the adversary only gets t signatures on a message m by corrupting signers or asking signing
queries, and he is able to produce a signature on m with grade t + 1. According to
the soundness of the NIZK proof system, there must be t + 1 valid signatures under
t + 1 different verification keys committed by the adversary. Note that because of the
extractability property of the commitment scheme, at the beginning, the simulator
can produce a simulated crs which contains an opening trapdoor for the commitment
scheme, and thus the simulator can open these commitments to retrieve the t+1 tuple
of signatures, verification keys, and certificates. If the verification keys are all certified by the the CA, then the adversary must have forged one new signature against
an honest signer; alternatively, the adversary could have forged a certificate for an
unregistered verification key. The simulator can examine these cases and break the
unforgeability of either Sig 0 or Sig.
Regarding anonymity, suppose the adversary submits m, l, S0 , S1 , D0 , D1 as the
challenge. Suppose, for simplicity, that S0 \S1 contains only one index i0 and similarly
S1 \ S0 contains only one index i1 . The simulator can use signatures σi0 , σi1 on m
under pki0 , pki1 to ask as a challenge in a plaintext indistinguishability game of the
underlying commitment scheme; after receiving Com(σib ), the simulator will create
a graded signature by computing the commitments to all other signatures on m and
simulate all the proofs (the latter part following from the zero-knowledge property).
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In this way, the simulator can use the adversary’s ability in breaking anonymity to
break the hiding property of the commitment scheme in a straightforward fashion.
Theorem 4. The scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive corruption attacks if Sig, Sig 0 are unforgeable digital signatures, Com is a binding (extractable)
commitment scheme, and the proof system is sound.
Proof: We show the security by a sequence of games. We start with the original
game Game0 , and prove that a polynomial time attacker’s advantage of distinguishing
any successive games is negligible.
Game0 :
• The simulator runs the key generation of Sig, and generates a key pair (msk, mpk).
It also runs the key generation algorithm of Sig 0 to generate the signing keyverification pairs. Then for each verification key vk, it picks a random integer
i ∈ [n], generates the certification of the corresponding verification key using
M S.Sign algorithm on (vk, i), and forms a set S that contains all certifications
and corresponding indices. Besides, it generates the global parameters param
including the crs strings for the commitment scheme and the NIZK proof system, and the total number n of allowed signers in the system. The simulator
keeps gsk, and gives gpk = (mpk, param) and S to the adversary.
• For each register query; the adversary A generates a fresh key pair (sk, vk) ←
S.Setup, and gives vk to the simulator. The simulator selects a random integer i from [n] − S as the index of vk (The challenger keeps a list T for
registered indices. If i ∈ T ∪ S, the simulator reselects it) and computes
certi = MS.Sign(msk, (vki , i)). C sends certi to A and writes (i, vk, certi ) to T.
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• For each signing key query of an index j ∈ S; the simulator gives the corresponding signing key skj to the adversary. The simulator also keeps a list C for
corrupted indices.
• For each signature query on the message m with index k ∈ [n]−T ; the simulator
computes σ = S.Sign(skk , m), and gives it to A.
• A submits a forgery σ (`) with grade ` > |C| + |T | + q for m∗ where q is the
number of signature queiries on m∗ . If Verify(σ (`) , `, m∗ , gpk) = 1, the adversary
wins the game.
Game1 : Same as Game0 , except we substitute Setup algorithm of the commitment
scheme with Extractable Setup algorithm which generates the crs string of the commitment scheme together with the extraction key ek.
Game2 : Same as Game1 , except we require that for each cuij = Com(crd, (Xiuj , α))
u
← P rove(crs, V eriuj , (Xiuj , α)) generated by the adversary
and associated proof πi,j
u
) = 1 where Eiuj is the corresponding
in the challenge phase, V er(crd, Eiuj , cuij , πi,j

verification equation.
Claim: Assuming the NIZK proof systems has two types of common reference strings
(hiding and binding) which are computationally indistinguishable, for any PPT adversary A,
(0)

(1)

|AdvA − AdvA | ≤ negl(λ).
P roof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A such that the difference the advantages of the adversary between both games is non negligible, then we can construct
a PPT algorithm B that use A to distinguish two types of CRS with non negligible
advantage. 
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Claim: Assuming the NIZK proof systems are sound , for any PPT A,
(1)

(2)

|AdvA − AdvA | ≤ negl(λ).

P roof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A such that the difference the advantages of A between both games is non negligible, then we will construct a PPT
algorithm B that uses A to break the soundness of the proof systems.
B gets the crs of the commitments from the challenger of the NIZK proof system.
It then computes (msk, mpk) ← M S.Setup(λ) and gives the gsk, gpk to the adversary. B can simulate the corrupt queries, the registration queries, and the signature
queries as in Game1 and Game2 . The only difference between two games is that, the
adversary can prove a false statement with non-negligible probability in Game1 . If
the algorithm B is dealing with the proofs of false statements, then it corresponds to
Game1 ; otherwise it corresponds to Game2 . Thus, B can break the soundness of the
underlying proof systems with non-negligible probability. 
Claim: Assuming Sig and Sig 0 are existentially unforgeable, and the commitment
scheme is perfectly binding, for any PPT A,
(2)

AdvA ≤ negl(λ).

P roof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A such that the difference the advantages of A between both games is non negligible, then we will construct a PPT
algorithm B that uses A to break the unforgeability of Sig or Sig 0 .
B gets mpk from the challenger of Sig and vk from the challenger of Sig 0 , and
requests a certification for vk. B also generates some signing key-verification key
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pairs, and requests the certifications for those verification keys. It then forms the set
S that contains all certifications and corresponding indices. Besides, B generates the
global parameters param that includes the extractable crs strings for the commitment
scheme with the extraction key ek and the NIZK proofs system, and the total number
n of the allowed signers in the system. B keeps ek, and gives (mpk, params) to the
adversary.
For each register query that the adversary makes, B gets the corresponding certification from the challenger of Sig; for each signing key query that the adversary
makes, if the corresponding verification key is vk, B aborts, otherwise gives the corresponding signing to the adversary; for each signature query on a message m, if the
adversary requests a signature for vk, B asks a signature on m from the challenger of
Sig 0 , otherwise produces the signature using the corresponding signing key.
When the adversary submits a valid forgery σ (k) on a message m∗ with the grade
`, B extracts all tuples {(vki , certi , σi )}i∈[`] uniquely from σ (k) using ek since the commitment scheme is perfectly binding (extractable). Since the number of registration
queries and the corruption queries add up to be less than `, there should be one tuple
(vki , certi , σi ) such that either σi is a valid forgery on m∗ under vki , or certi is a valid
forgery on (vki , i) under mpk. If σi is a valid forgery on m∗ , since the probability of
vki = vk is 1/|S|, B can use this forgery to break the unforgeability of Sig. If certi
is a valid forgery on (vki , i), then B can use the pair to break the unforgeability of
Sig 0 . This concludes the proof.
Theorem 5. The scheme satisfies full anonymity, if Com is computationally hiding
and the proof system is zero-knowledge.
Proof: We show the security by a sequence of hybrid experiments. We start with the
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original experiment Game0 , and prove that any polynomial time attacker’s advantage
of distinguishing any successive experiments is negligible.
Game0 :
• The challenger runs the key generation of the scheme Sig, and generates a
key pair (msk, mpk). It also generates global parameters param including the
crs strings for the commitment scheme and the NIZK proof system, and the
total number n of allowed signers in the system. The challenger gives gpk =
(mpk, param) and gsk to the adversary.
• The adversary selects two sets S1 and S0 of indexes such that |S0 | = |S1 | = k,
S1 \ S0 = {i0 }, and S0 \ S1 = {j0 }. It first runs S.Setup algorithm to generate
signing key-public key pair (sk, pk) for each index, then computes a certification
certi for each public key vki of the index i using gsk. The adversary also
produces signatures σi on same message m under each public key pki . It finally
gives the index k as the level, the message m, two sets of indexes S0 , S1 , and
two sets of tuples D0 = {certi , σi , pki }, D1 = {certj .σj , pkj } where i ∈ S0 and
j ∈ S1 .
• The challenger sets b = 0, produces a graded signature σ (k) on m using the
tuples Db , and gives σ (k) to the adversary.
• The adversary gives a guess b0 to the challenger, and wins the game if b = b0 .
Game1 : Same as Game0 , except we substitute Setup algorithm of the commitment
scheme with SimSetup algorithm which generates the simulable crs string of the
commitment schemes and proofs.
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1
, πi20 , πi30 , πi40 ) of
Game2 : Same as Game1 , except that the challenger changes (πi,0
0

0

0

0

index i0 from σ (k) with the simulated proofs (πi01 , πi02 , πi03 , πi04 ).
Game3 : Same as Game2 , except that the challenger changes the commitments
(c1i,0 , c2i0 , c3i0 , c4i0 ) of index i0 ∈ S0 from σ (k) with (c1j,0 , c2j0 , c3j0 , c4j0 ) of the index j0 ∈ S1 .
Game4 : Same as Game3 , except that the challenger changes the simulated proofs
0

0

0

0

(πi01 , πi02 , πi03 , πi04 ) from σ (k) with the proofs (πj10 , πj20 , πj30 , πj40 ). Thus, in the final game,
the challenger generates the graded signature σ (k) using the tuples from the set D1 .
Claim: Assuming the proof systems are zero-knowledge, for any PPT A,
(0)

(1)

|AdvA − AdvA | ≤ negl(λ).

P roof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A such that the difference of the advantages of the adversary between both games is non negligible, then we can construct
a PPT algorithm B that use A to break the zero knowledge property of the proof
systems. 
Claim: Assuming the proof systems are zero-knowledge, for any PPT A,
(1)

(2)

|AdvA − AdvA | ≤ negl(λ).

P roof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A such that the difference of the advantages of the adversary between both games is non negligible, then we will construct
a PPT algorithm B that use A to break the zero knowledge property of the proof
systems.
B generates (gsk, gpk) and gives them to the adversary as in Game1 and Game2 .
After getting it, the simulator gives the challenge tuple (vki0 , certi0 , σi0 ) to the chal-
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lenger of the proof system, and gets the corresponding commitments comi0 and proofs
(b)

πi0 . B then simulates all other commitments and proofs and gives the final signature
to the adversary. If b = 0, then it corresponds to Game1 , otherwise it corresponds
to Game2 . Thus, if the difference of the advantages of the adversary between both
games is non negligible, then B can use A to break the zero knowledge of the proof
system. 
Claim: Assuming the commitment scheme is computationally hiding, for any PPT
adversary A,
(2)

(3)

|AdvA − AdvA | ≤ negl(λ).
P roof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A such that the difference of the advantages of the adversary between both games is non negligible, then we will construct
a PPT algorithm B that use A to break hiding property of the commitment scheme.
B generates (gsk, gpk) and gives them to the adversary as in Game2 and Game3 .
After getting it, the simulator gives the tuples (vki0 , certi0 , σi0 ) and (vkj0 , certj0 , σj0 )
to the challenger of the commitment scheme, and gets the challenge commitments
(c1b , c2b , c3b , c4b ). B also simulates all other commitments and corresponding proofs, and
gives the final signature to the adversary. If b = i0 , then it corresponds to Game2 ,
otherwise it corresponds to Game3 . Thus, if the difference of the advantages of the
adversary between both games is non negligible, then B can use A to break the hiding
property of the commitment scheme. 
Claim: Assuming the proof systems are zero-knowledge, for any PPT A,
(3)

(4)

|AdvA − AdvA | ≤ negl(λ).
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P roof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A such that the difference of the advantages of the adversary between both games is non negligible, then we will construct
a PPT algorithm B that use A to break the zero knowledge property of the proof
systems.
B generates (gsk, gpk) and gives them to the adversary as in Game3 and Game4 .
After getting it, the simulator gives the challenge tuple (vkj0 , certj0 , σj0 ) to the challenger of the proof system, and gets the corresponding commitments comj0 and proofs
(b)

πj0 . B then simulates all other commitments and proofs and gives the final signature
to the adversary. If b = 0, then it corresponds to Game3 , otherwise it corresponds
to Game4 . Thus, if the difference of the advantages of the adversary between both
games is non negligible, then B can use A to break the zero knowledge of the proof
system.
In conclusion, since any PPT attacker’s advantage of distinguishing any successive
games is negligible, the adversary cannot distinguish two graded signatures with the
same grade. Hence, the scheme is fully anonymous.

5.2.1

An Efficient Instantiation

In order to get a graded signature with size linear in the grade, we need to make
all the NIZK proofs πi1j , πi2j , πi3j , πi4j to be constant size. One natural approach, that
also yields a standard model construction, is to instantiate the scheme with signature
schemes which are compatible with the Groth-Sahai proof system [54]. Note that
a structure preserving signature or automorphic signature [1] satisfies exactly our
needs – both the verification key and the signature belong to the same group, and the
verification are conjunctions of pairing product equations; furthermore, this signature
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scheme allows signing on a pair of messages as well. For Sig, the CA needs to sign
on pk and index i; we instantiate this with an automorphic signature on (g x , g i ),
where pk = g x ; for Sig 0 , in order to sign a message m ∈ Zp , we instantiate the
algorithm via the same signature scheme operating on a single group element equal
to g m . It is straightforward to obtain constant size proofs realizing πi1 , πi2 by applying
the Groth-Sahai framework.
For πi3 , πi4 , we use the constant size non-interactive range proof for range [0, H]
proposed in [26] 3 . First, we apply the range proof for the range [1, n] in order to
establish the “larger than” statement. Relying on the additive homomorphic property
of the commitment scheme, we can do a straightforward “shift” in the protocol of [26],
in order to prove x ∈ [1, n], where x is committed in Com(x). Specifically the prover
executes the proof with respect to the commitment ψ = Com(x)/Com(1; 0) where
Com(x; r) denotes the commitment on x with randomness r, thus establishing that
x − 1 ∈ [0, H]. With this construction at hand, it follows that the proofs πi3 , πi4 are
also constant size.
Now the only problem left is to show the index committed for πi1 , πi2 is consistent
with the value committed for πi3 , πi4 . We observe that the commitment schemes used
in the range proof include a BBS encryption type of commitment, which is compatible
with Groth-Sahai proof system and this proof can be constructed easily. Specifically,
the NIZK proof establishes that the two commitments c1 , c2 belong to the language:
L = {(c1 , c2 )|∃x, r1 , r2 , s1 , s2 , s.t, c1 = (g x+r1 +r2 , f r1 , hr2 ) ∧ c2 = (g x us11 us22 )},
3

Using different instantiations of parameters, they obtain suitable communication and verification
complexity for different scenarios. In our case, adding CRS with O(log 1+ n)-length to the public
parameters will be enough to achieve constant size range proof and verification time.
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where g, f, h, u1 , u2 are all contained in CRS.

5.3

Graded Signatures Supporting Revocation

Since our notion of graded signature is directly built upon the PKI, it would be nice if
we can support certificate revocation as well due to the same reasons as in the regular
PKI setting, e.g., some signing key might get compromised. A common method for
revocation in the PKI setting is that the CA publishes a revocation list that maintains
all the revoked certificates, and every user can check it.
In our construction of the graded signature scheme, in order to guarantee that
the signatures are all from the valid signers and their privacy is preserved, we have
one important step that the user commits to the certificates and the public keys
and proves that the public keys are certified, i.e., the certificates contained in the
commitments are valid signatures under the master public key of the CA. We can see
that in principle, it would not be very difficult to extend our construction to support
revocation as we can simply let the user to add one more proof that the certificates
committed are not in the public revocation list. 4 . The challenging task is that how
we can maintain the signature size still to be linear in the grade, which means we
need to keep each non-membership proof to be constant!

5

Fortunately, Blazy et al [11] propose an efficient NIZK proof system to prove an
exclusive statement, i.e., the statement does not belong to a language L. We can
instantiate their proof system to prove that a committed value does not belong to a
4

Instead of certifications, it would be enough to keep only the indices of the revoked signers in
the revocation list.
5
A straightforward way to show that the committed value does not equal to any of the set element
is highly inefficient due to the inequality proof and the AND proof.
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given set S. The main idea of their technique is that the user first generates a “proof”
π̃ showing that the statement belongs to L, and it can not pass the verification (as
he does not have the witness), then he proves using another π̃ 0 that π̃ is generated
honestly, i.e., it is indeed computed following the regular prover algorithm. In this
way, π̃, π̃ 0 together convince the verifier about the negation, as if not, the prover can
not generate π̃, π̃ 0 simultaneously. For details of the technique, we refer to [11]. Now
to instantiate the non-membership proof, we can start with the membership proof we
use [11] to generate π̃ which is constant size and we then prove each component of π̃
is generated honestly. Since [11] is compatible with Groth-Sahai [53], the validity of
the components can be again proven efficiently using the Groth-Sahai proof. Thus,
we can conclude that we can extend our graded signature to support certificate revocation by adding the above non-membership proof for each committed certificates.
Furthermore, each pair of such non-membership proof is with constant size, thus the
total signature size is still linear in the number of grade.

5.4

Applications

The new primitive can be useful in a number of applications that we discuss below.
Anonymous Petitions: In an anonymous petition, the petitioner aims at convincing
an organization that a certain number of people have a consensus on one issue, and it
is desired that the identity of each participant remains hidden. Our graded signature
immediately solves this problem. Suppose every valid voter has a registered public
key, and the one who initiates a petition on a message m, tries to get as much
support (signatures) on m as she can. At the end, she consolidates all the signatures
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into one, and presents to the organization the message, the graded signature and the
corresponding grade l. The privacy of all signers will be preserved, and the grade
precisely reflects how many signatures the consolidator collected. The organization
can verify that indeed l different signers are needed to produce the l-grade signature
using the PKI parameters.
Anonymous Delegation of Signing Rights adhering to Threshold Policies:
Consider an organization whose members are in a PKI and wish to authorize in
anonymous fashion a certain individual to execute certain tasks without necessarily
revealing their names. The authorization requires a certain quorum that, if reached,
it should be universally accepted. For instance, suppose that the members of the
board of trustees of a listed company would like to authorize the CEO to take certain
decisions on behalf of them. Such authorization may require the agreement of the
majority (or other suitable percentage) of the trustees. Using graded-signatures the
CEO can obtain the signature of a suitable number of trustees on her public-key and
then consolidate those to demonstrate the fact that a suitable number of trustees
endorse her actions.
Graded Certificates for multi-CA PKI’s: As a number of incidents have shown,
certification authorities (CA) can be corrupted (e.g, see [63]) and in this way the
security of critical Internet protocols such as TLS can be jeopardized. In a multi-CA
setting a user may obtain certificates from multiple PKI’s tying her identity to her
public-key. Assuming the CA’s themselves can be certified by an acceptable top-level
CA, a user can form a “graded certificate” by consolidating her distinct certificates
coming from different CA’s into a single graded signature. The grade will reflect
the number of certificates that the user has collected on her identity. Using graded
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signatures it is thus possible to enable a certificate negotiation step between two
communicating parties that (1) provides sufficient assurance on their identities (by
requiring a minimum signature grade for both sides) and (2) maintains their privacy
in terms of their CA choices as the anonymity of the graded signature reveals only
the grade but not the individual entities that have provided certificates.

Chapter 6
Graded Encryption
In the game show “who wants to be a millionaire”, participants earn money as rewards
by answering a series of consecutive multiple-choice questions. The questions are
distributed in several rounds, and the difficulty and the amount of money of the
questions increase with the rounds. After correctly answering the question in each
round, the contestants can either choose “walk away” with the current rewards or
choose “continue” to go after a higher reward with the understanding that if they fail
in the next round they will loose everything. The above description is a simplified
version of the game, but it captures the essential idea of it.
In a live game that operates in stages with an increasing sequence of rewards,
one can implement a scheme that the audience can audit and a trusted host can
ensure the distribution of the questions and the reward. In a more general setting,
in multi-stage computer games a player has to advance the game stage-by-stage, and
receive a corresponding reward for advancing. The rewards could be monetary, but
also virtual devices that make the player more competitive in the next stages so that
84
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the player expects to “unlock” such device from some existing elements when they
complete some tasks at a certain level. In a distributed version of all those games,
managing multi-stage games for a large amount of players may be quite complicated,
and especially in some computational intensive 3-D video games, it may be required
that multiple servers are needed to handle the game management for different stages.
Moreover, the servers can be targeted by attackers who want to pass the game or
directly “steal” the rewards.
We propose a new identity-based cryptographic primitive which we call graded encryption. The new primitive enables us to design the reward distribution mechanism
for such online games distributively in a way that the damage from the corruption of
the servers can be reduced to as little as possible, and the task of managing the games
and rewards becomes as simple as possible. In a graded encryption scheme, there is
one central (mostly offline) authority and a number of sub-authorities holding master
keys that correspond to different levels. As in identity-based encryption, a sender can
encrypt a message using only the identity of the receiver (plus public parameters)
but it may also specify a numerical grade i. Users may decrypt messages directed to
their identity at grade i as long as they have executed a key-upgrade protocol with
sub-authorities 1, . . . , i. We require a grade i ciphertext to be secure in a strong
sense: as long as there is one sub-authority with index j ≤ i that is not corrupted,
the plaintext should be hidden from any recipient that has not properly upgraded her
identity.
Identity based encryption [17, 47, 90] could be possibly used to build a graded
encryption generically, but a black-box construction incurs an overhead which is linear
in the number of levels (more detailed discussion is in section 3.2). In an hierarchical
IBE [59], a user with identity a1 can derive secret key for user with identity ha1 , a2 i,
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but not the other way around. One may think of using an HIBE to construct a GE,
starting from an identity with a largest level ha1 , . . . , an i and gradually improving
his grade by obtaining keys for ha1 , . . . , an−i i. However, it is not obvious how to
achieve this efficiently. We want to emphasize that in a GE scheme, there is no
hierarchy among sub-authorities in the sense of HIBE, i.e., sub-authority of level i
cannot decrypt ciphertexts of level i − 1.
In threshold public key encryption systems [4, 15, 24, 35], at least t parties jointly
decrypt a ciphertext. The threshold of the system should be fixed during setup.
In [33], an extension of threshold public key encryption to the dynamic setting was
proposed so that any user can dynamically join the system, and the sender can dynamically set the threshold in each encryption. Once the adversary corrupts more
than the threshold shareholders, the security collapses. In a graded encryption, on
the other hand, even if all except one authority is corrupted, we can guarantee the
security of the ciphertext which has a level greater than the index of the uncorrupted
authority. Furthermore, the authorities in a GE do not communicate or can not decrypt messages, only provide assistance to the user to upgrade his decrypting ability.
The threshold encryption schemes do not provide an “ordered” mechanism suitable
for the type of sequential upgrading that we consider here is needed.
In multiple encryption [38,74,76], a message is encrypted several times with independent keys or even using different encryption algorithms to provide better security.
As suggested by [37], the message m can be split into shares m1 , ..., mi and all shares
can be encrypted using a public key pki associated to the authority i. A user is
only able to decrypt the ciphertexts when they have all corresponding secret keys
sk1 , ..., ski taken from the associated authorities. This trivial solution has the secret
key size and the ciphertext size linear in the grade of the ciphertext.
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Ateniese and Hohenberg [2] showed how multi-use proxy re-signatures, which allow
a proxy to convert a valid signature of a message from Alice into a valid signature
of same message from Bob, can be elegantly used to prove that a certain path was
taken in a graph (our third application). Our graded encryption scheme provides
an alternative solution for this application. Our construction also applies to the
applications that require encryption and as such they are out of the scope of the
scenarios that proxy re-signatures are applicable.
Our Results.
We formalize a new cryptographic primitive as an extension of IBE that we call
graded encryption (GE). In a graded encryption scheme, there is a central authority
and a number of sub-authorities corresponding to fixed indices. GE enables a sender
to specify a grade for a ciphertext depending on the importance of the plaintext. The
receiver of the ciphertext can decrypt it only if he holds a secret key with the same
grade (or higher grade depending on the implementation). Here the level of a secret
key determines the number of the authorities the receiver should contact (we will
use both terms, grade and level interchangeably). More importantly, every user can
start with a secret key generated by one authority and then can upgrade the level of
his secret key by sequentially contacting other authorities depending on their indices.
The authority can provide some auxiliary information to the user so that the user
can upgrade the level of his key.
We highlight some requirements of a GE scheme here that makes the primitive
challenging to implement. The security requirement we emphasize is that a secret key
with grade i can not be useful in decrypting a ciphertext with grade j when j > i;
in our formalization we even consider the stronger requirement that, any authority
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except the central authority can be corrupted as long as one authority in the chain
of 1, 2, . . . , i remains honest. We require that a ciphertext with grade i would remain
secure in such conditions. This strong requirement is necessary in applications where
we want to protect against an adversary who might directly corrupt the authority at
level i while ignoring authorities corresponding to stage-1 to stage-(i − 1) in the hope
of unlocking ciphertexts of level i.
We present an efficient scheme of graded encryption that has both secret key and
ciphertext of constant size. We further extend it to a two-mode version that there
are two types of partial keys that each authority can provide, and depending on that,
there are two types of secret keys of each level. A Type-1 secret key is used to decrypt
a ciphertext with the same level, but it can not be upgraded anymore; while a Type-2
secret key can be upgraded to higher level depending on the type of partial secret
key, but it is not useful for decrypting ciphertexts. The two-mode GE is suitable for
the application of online games like “who wants to be a millionaire”, i.e., the Type-1
secret keys correspond to the choice of “walk away”; and a Type-2 partial key is
used as long as the player chooses “continue” and advances levels (without receiving
a reward).

6.1

Definition and Security Model

As elaborated above, we are considering a new cryptographic primitive we call graded
encryption, which can be seen as an extension of the canonical identity based encryption [17, 85, 90]. In a graded encryption scheme, each ciphertext encrypted for an
identity is associated with an integer j, called the grade of the ciphertext, according
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to the importance of the content. Every secret key of an identity is also associated
with an integer i, which we call the grade of the secret key. We require that a ciphertext encrypted under identity id with grade j can only be decrypted by secret
key of id with the same grade. Furthermore, there is a mechanism that the user with
identity id can upgrade his secret key with grade i to grade (i + 1) if the secret key
with grade i was updated in same manner all the way from a key with grade 1.
We present the formal definition of a graded encryption scheme as the following
five algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Upgrade, Enc, and Dec.
• Setup(λ, n) This algorithm takes a security parameter λ and a maximum grade
n as inputs and outputs the system parameters P , the master public keys
{mpki }i=1,...,n and the master secret keys denoted by {mski }i=1,...,n where each
(mpki , mski ) correspond to a level i.
• KeyGen(id, i, mski , P ) This algorithm takes user id and an integer i, the corresponding master secret key mski and the system parameter P as input, and
outputs a partial secret key pski for grade i.
• Upgrade(ski−1 , pski ) This algorithm takes a secret key ski−1 with grade (i − 1)
and a partial secret key pski , and outputs the secret key ski for level i.
• Enc(m, mpki , id, P ) This randomized algorithm takes the level i public key
mpki , a message m ∈ M , where M is the message space, the user’s identity id
and the system parameter P as inputs. It outputs a ciphertext ci with grade i.
• Dec(ci , ski , P ) This deterministic algorithm takes a ciphertext ci with grade i
encrypted under the identity id, the secret key ski with grade i for id and the
system parameter P as inputs. It outputs message m.
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We first define the correctness that using a secret key with grade i for identity
id, one should be able to decrypt a grade i ciphertext encrypted under id, i.e.,:
∀m ∈ M, Pr[Dec(Enc(m, mpki , id, P ), ski , P ) = m] = 1.
We now present the security model of a graded encryption scheme. From the
exemplary applications in the introduction, we can see that the only way a user can
decrypt a graded ciphertext with a grade i is if she executes a sequential update for
her secret key from level 1 to level i. In our security model we allow the adversary
to corrupt a set of authorities, and get partial secret key of an identity for any level.
But we require that as long as there exists an i0 ≤ i such that neither the adversary
has the master secret key mski0 nor she has the partial secret key for the challenge
identity in this level, she would not be able to have significant advantage decrypting
a ciphertext with grade i. Thus, on top of the basic security requirement for any
identity based encryption scheme, we have to capture this new security requirement.
We adapt the standard ID-IND-CPA security model for our purpose. There are
two modified queries allowed for the adversary. Corrupt queries allow the adversary
to get a master secret key corresponding to a level i of her choice; and KeyGen queries
allow the adversary not only to get secret keys for other identities, but also allow her
to learn some of the secret keys corresponding to certain grades for the challenge
identity. Consider the following game between an adversary A and a challenger C,
• Setup. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm and returns all the master
public keys {mpki }i=1,...,n and the maximum level n.
• The adversary is allowed to interleave the following queries.
– Corrupt query. The adversary A ask a subset S of level master secret
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keys, where S ⊂ [1, n] is of her choice and with size q1 , and the challenger
C returns {mski }i∈S .
– KeyGen query. The adversary A asks a number of KeyGen queries for
identities id1 , . . . , idq0 w.r.t. level i1 , . . . , iq0 of her choice, and the challenger
returns pski1 (id1 ), . . . , pskiq0 (idq0 ), where pski (idj ) is the KeyGen query on
identity idj for level i.
• Challenge. The adversary A sends an identity id∗ , an integer i∗ , and two messages m0 , m1 . The challenger flips a coin b and sends back cb = Enc(mb , mpki∗ , id∗ , P ).
• The adversary continues asking Corrupt and KeyGen queries.
• Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b0 .
We do allow the adversary to ask KeyGen queries for id∗ w.r.t some levels, but
we need to rule out attacks that trivialize the adversarial goal. Suppose S 0 is the
subset of levels that A asks KeyGen queries for id∗ . We require that {1, . . . , i∗ } \
({1, . . . , n} \ S ∪ S 0 ) 6= ∅, i.e., there exists an i0 ≤ i∗ , the adversary does not have
mski0 , and also she does not have a partial secret key for id∗ at level i0 .
Definition 4. If b = b0 , the adversary wins. A graded encryption scheme is (t, q, q 0 , )fully ID-IND-CPA secure if all t-time adversaries making at most q corrupt queries
and q 0 KeyGen queries have advantage at most  in winning the above game.
In the game defined above, the adversary does not need to declare the target
identity or the target grade at the beginning of the game, we call the above game a
fully ID-IND-CPA game. Other possible variants can also be considered, i.e., if the
adversary needs to declare the target identity at the beginning of the game, we call
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it selective-ID IND-CPA game; if the adversary needs to declare the target grade at
the beginning of the game, we call it selective-grade ID-IND-CPA game; if both of
them need to be declared at the beginning, we call it selective IND-CPA game.
Remark that our security model explicitly states that there is no hierarchy among
the master secret keys, having a master secret key with a higher grade does not grant
the ability to decrypt a lower grade ciphertext.

6.2

Constructions of Graded Encryption

In this section, we set forth to construct efficient graded encryption schemes and
briefly describe how we could deploy such schemes. First, we can have a simple generic
construction of a graded encryption scheme from any IBE scheme by doing a message
splitting. Briefly, in Setup, n independent master key pairs {(mpki , mski )}i=1,...,n for
each authority are generated by calling the Setup algorithm of the underlying IBE. To
construct a ciphertext ci with the grade i, the message is simply split into m1 , . . . , mi ,
and each part mj is encrypted under the receiver’s identity by using corresponding
master public key mpkj . A secret key with grade i consists of i partial secret key pkj
such that each of them is generated by calling the KeyGen algorithm of the underlying
IBE. Furthermore, the decryption algorithm can be easily done by decrypting each
piece of ciphertext using the corresponding key and combine the plaintexts to return
the message.
This solution is easy and generic, however, it incurs large overhead (linear in the
number of levels) of the secret key and the ciphertext for each level. A much more
preferable solution would achieve a constant size for the secret key, ciphertext and
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each master key pair.
Intuitively, if an IBE scheme has some kind of key homomorphism so that one can
aggregate secret keys to reduce the key size; also, if the master public keys can be
aggregated, then the ciphertext size could also be brought down to constant. Actually,
most of the existing IBE schemes satisfy those requirements, thus we pick the Waters
IBE [90] as an example to present the idea. We leave as an interesting open problem
whether it is possible to have a black-box construction of a constant overhead graded
encryption scheme from any IBE scheme. The detailed construction (we call S-I)
based on Waters IBE is as follows:
• Setup(λ, n). The algorithm first chooses a random generator g ∈ G and a
random element g2 of G. It also chooses a set of random numbers a1 , . . . , an ∈
Zp . For i = 1, . . . , n, the algorithm computes mpki = g

Pi

j=1

aj

, and mski = g2ai .

The algorithm also chooses a random value u0 ∈ G and a random l-length
vector U = (ui )i=1,...,` where ui ∈ G and ` is the length of the identities. It
outputs the master key pairs {mpki , mski }i=1,...,n and the system parameter
P = (g, g2 , u0 , U ).
• KeyGen(id, i, mski , P ). Suppose V ⊆ [n] is the set of all indices j for which
idj = 1. The algorithm then chooses a random r ∈ Zp , and computes pski as
Q
(pski1 , pski2 ) = (mski · H(id)r , g r ), where H(id) = u0 i∈V ui .
• Upgrade(ski−1 , pski ): If i = 1, sk1 = psk1 ; If i > 1, the algorithm computes
1
2
ski = (ski1 , ski2 ) where (ski−1
· pski1 , ski−1
· pski2 ).

• Enc(id, m, mpki , P ) To encrypt a message m under identity id for grade i, the
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algorithm computes ci as: (C1 , C2 , C3 ) equal to:
i
P

aj

(e(mpki , g2 )s · m, g s , H(id)s ) = (e(g j=1 , g2 )s · m, g s , H(id)s ).

It returns (C1 , C2 , C3 ) as the grade i ciphertext ci .
• Dec(ci , ski , P ). Taking the level i ciphertext ci = (C1 , C2 , C3 ) and level i secret
key ski = (ski1 , ski2 ) as input, it computes C1 · e(ski2 , C3 )/e(ski1 , C2 ) = m. It
returns m as the plaintext.
Deployment: Based on our applications, our graded encryption scheme can be implemented as follows: a central authority initializes and sets up the system at the
beginning, and distributes each level master keys to the individual authorities. Then,
the central authority goes offline. The KeyGen algorithm is executed by each individual authority which only has a master secret corresponding to one level. When
a user has a secret key with grade i, together with the partial secret key with grade
(i + 1) generated by authority (i + 1), he can upgrade his key to grade (i + 1) locally.
Observe that in the above construction, mski does not correspond to mpk, thus if
the adversary does not update a secret key from grade 1, corrupting an intermediate
authority does not give much advantage. Furthermore, the master secret key with
grade i is independent of the master public keys with smaller grade, thus the online
authorities can not decrypt the user’s ciphertext as in the normal IBE setting unless all of them collude. This reveals an interesting fact that our graded encryption
scheme provides some defense to the key escrow problem in IBE systems.
Theorem 6. S-I is fully ID-IND-CPA secure if Waters IBE [90] is ID-IND-CPA
secure.
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Proof. We here show how to reduce the security of S-I to that of Waters IBE.
The simulator S first makes a random guess for the index j of the sub-authority
which the adversary will not corrupt, and S will abort if the guess is incorrect. For
other indices, S selects a random ai and generates the master key pair using (ai , g ai )
multiplying all g ai with the Waters IBE master public key, S gives the system mpk.
Note that S knows msk for all i 6= j thus can answer all Corrupt and KeyGen queries
trivially, and KeyGen query for j can be answered by asking Waters IBE challenger
secret key query.
In the challenge phase; the adversary submits two messages m0 , m1 and an identity
id∗ with a grade i∗ . if j > i∗ , the simulator aborts. Otherwise, the simulator uses
the Waters IBE challenge ciphertext (c1 , c2 , c3 ) by asking m0 , m1 on id∗ to derive
Pi

(b)

ci = (c1 .e(c2 , g2 )

k=1,k6=j

ak

, c2 , c3 ) to the adversary as the challenge ciphertext where

all ak are integers generated at the beginning of the game for the master secret keys.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that the probability of which the simulator aborts is
bounded by n1 .

6.3

Two-Mode Graded Encryption Schemes

In order to be applicable for the online quiz show like “who wants to be a millionaire”,
we need that our GE Upgrade algorithm supports two types of operations, i.e., decrypt
now or continue. We revise the above construction that there are two KeyGen
algorithms outputting two types of partial key. To be more specific, if a player wants
to take the current rewards and leave, the authority prepares a partial secret key
of Type-1, which together with the current key of the user, can be upgraded to a
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Type-1 secret key to decrypt the reward ciphertext, but Type-1 secret key can not be
upgraded anymore; if he decides to “continue”, the authority prepares a partial secret
key of Type-2, which can only be used to upgrade secret key to a upper level, and
not useful decrypting current level ciphertext. Due to the nice property of our graded
encryption construction, we can achieve such a scheme. We first show a modified
construction of graded encryption scheme which has two KeyGen algorithms, we
call the following construction S-II.
• Setup(λ, n). The algorithm first chooses a random generator g ∈ G and a random element g2 of G. It also chooses a set of random numbers a0 , b0 . . . , an , bn ∈
Zp . For i = 0, . . . , n, the algorithm computes mpki = g
(2)

g2ai , mski

Pi−1

j=0 bj +ai

(1)

, and mski

=

= g2bi . The algorithm also chooses a random value u0 ∈ G and a

random l-length vector U = (ui )i=1,...,` where ui ∈ G and ` is the length of the
(1)

(2)

identities. It outputs the master key pairs {mpki , mski , mski }i=0,...,n and the
system parameter P = (g, g2 , u0 , U ).
(1)

• KeyGen1(id, i, mski , P ). Suppose V ⊆ [n] is the set of all indices j for which
idj = 1. The algorithm then chooses a random r ∈ Zp , and computes the
(1)

type-1 partial secret key pski
Q
H(id) = u0 i∈V ui .

(1)

(1)

(1)

as (pski,1 , pski,2 ) = (mski · H(id)r , g r ), where

(2)

• KeyGen2(id, i, mski , P ). Suppose V ⊆ [n] is the set of all indices j for which
idj = 1. The algorithm then chooses a random r ∈ Zp , and computes the
(2)

type-2 partial secret key pski
Q
H(id) = u0 i∈V ui .

(2)

(2)

(2)

as (pski,1 , pski,2 ) = (mski · H(id)r , g r ), where
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(b)

• Upgrade(ski−1 , pski ): If i = 0, sk0 = psk0 ; If i > 0, for both b = 1, 2, the
(1)

(2)

(1)

(b)

(2)

(b)

algorithm computes ski = (ski , ski ) where (ski−1 · pski,1 , ski−1 · pski,2 ).
• Enc(id, m, mpki , P ) To encrypt a message m under identity id for grade i, the
algorithm computes ci as:
i−1
P

(C1 , C2 , C3 ) = (e(mpki , g2 )s · m, g s , H(id)s ) = (e(g j=0

bj +ai

, g2 )s · m, g s , H(id)s ).

It returns (C1 , C2 , C3 ) as the grade i ciphertext ci .
• Dec(ci , ski ). Taking the level i ciphertext ci = (C1 , C2 , C3 ) and the level i secret
key ski = (ski,1 , ski,2 ) as input, it computes C1 · e(ski,2 , C3 )/e(ski,1 , C2 ) = m. It
returns m as plaintext.
(1)

Note that the Type-1 secret key ski is accumulated from (i−1) Type-2 partial secret
keys and with a Type-1 partial secret key as the last one. Besides, it corresponds to
the exponent in the master public key, thus can be used for decrypting the ciphertext
with level i. But we can also see that the Type-1 secret key cannot be upgraded
anymore for next level as there is no way to eliminate the Type-1 partial secret key in
the middle . While the Type-2 secret key is accumulated all by Type-2 partial secret
keys, thus it can not be used for decryption unless upgrade at the end using some
Type-1 partial secret key.

6.4

Applications of Graded Encryption Schemes

Our primitive is motivated by a bunch of interesting applications. In this section
we will show in more detail how graded encryption schemes can be used to design
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efficient or alternative solutions for those real world problems. We will focus on three
applications: 1) graded rewarding system, 2) online quiz show like “who wants to be
a millionaire”, and 3) proving that a certain path was in a graph.

6.4.1

Graded rewarding system

In a graded reward system, there are multiple stages of tasks, and there are rewards
corresponding to the task of each stage. Once the user completes a task, he should
be given access to the corresponding reward. In many such systems, the tasks have
hierarchy, i.e., a user has to finish task 1, . . . , i, respectively, in order to start task
(i + 1). The best example of such system is online video games: a user has to
sequentially complete the tasks associated to different stages with certain difficulty
to gain the experience points. He then uses these experience points to unlock some
rewards, and proceed to the next level of challenge. Our graded encryption scheme
will enable us to utilize a simple model that there is an individual authority who
manages the tasks for each stage. Hence, corrupting each individual authority does
not influence the security of rewards for other stages, nor propagates the damage
outside this stage.
For the implementation, we will have the following system: there is a central
authority and n authorities so that each of them manages each level i individually.
The central authority initializes and sets up the system, and assigns associated keys
into each authority correspondingly. Furthermore, the central authority also prepares
a set of identities, and for each identity, produces the ciphertexts by encrypting all
the rewards corresponding to each level. It then gives all identities together with the
corresponding ciphertexts to the first level authority. Note that the central authority
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will be offline in general. Only when the number of users exceeds the number of
identities prepared at setup, it comes online to prepare another set of such ciphertexts,
and becomes offline again.
A user starts his journey of conquering the challenges the game presents by registering the first level authority and getting a bunch of rewards locked in some ciphertexts. Once he finishes the task of stage i, the authority i verdicts the achievement
and provides a partial “certificate” which can be used together with the “certificate”
that the user currently holds, to unlock the corresponding reward. We assume here
explicitly that there is an independent authentication mechanism that each authority
can check whether the user does finish the task, and we will present a simple one in
the next application.
A bit more formally, in a graded reward system, there are n stages of challenges,
and for each user, there is a reward after finishing each challenge. There is a restriction for the application; the user can only start the challenge at stage i, if he
already completed all tasks associated to previous levels. We use the following algorithms to represent a graded reward system: Setup, Register, Proceed, Reward.
From functionality point of view, Setup algorithm computes the master keys of the
authorities as {mpki , mski }i=1,...,n for i = 1, . . . , n, and prepares the identities idj
idj

where j = 1, . . . , N , for the identities idj , computes the ciphertexts ci

of rewards mi

correspoding to stage i; Register prepares the first level secret key of the user idj ,
idj

gives it to the user together with all ciphertexts ci

containing the rewards mi for

i = 1, . . . , n; Proceed algorithm allows a user to get a certificate pski after finishing
a certain task and upgrade his secret key to next level; Reward algorithm provides
a reward to the user depending on the task of the stage the user completes. In
other words, after getting the secret key with level i, the user decrypts corresponding
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idj

ciphertext ci

under his identity idj , and gets the reward mi .

From the security we discussed, given an i-level ciphertext the adversary cannot
learn anything about the corresponding plaintext, even he corrupts all servers except
one such that its index is smaller than i. So the player cannot reach the content of
the ciphertext of level i if he fails on any stage from 0 to i even he is able to corrupt
some of the intermediate authorities. Furthermore, each level ciphertext is composed
of only constant number of group elements, and both the authorities and the players
keep only constant size keys.

6.4.2

Online quiz shows

As the motivating example, we ask how to design an online quiz shows like the famous
“who wants to be a millionaire”. In such systems, the user has to answer questions
with different level of difficulties. If the user provides a correct answer to a given
question, he will be given the choice of “continue” or “leave with the current money”.
When the user chooses “leave”, he can get the current reward and leave the game.
But if he chooses “continue”, instead of getting reward, he passes to the next stage
to gain higher reward. However, he has to pass the next level challenge in order to
get a chance to be able to choose again.
In order to support two types of operations explained above, we will use the extended construction. If the players decide to “continue”, the authority prepares the
partial secret key of type-2 by calling KeyGen2, which can only be used to upgrade
secret key to a upper level, and not useful decrypting current level ciphertext. If they
want to take the current rewards and leave, the authority prepares the partial secret
key of type-1 by calling KeyGen2, which together with the current key of the user,
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can be used to decrypt the reward ciphertext, furthermore, this key can not be upgraded. We also develop a simple authentication mechanism, in which each authority
has a hash value of the answers, (we assume here the answers for each question are
unique, the general case can be handled using a zero-knowledge proof system). Once
the user figures out the answers, he provides the hash values to the authority to be
able to make his choice of “continue” or “leave with the current rewards”. Following
the extended construction and the simple authentication mechanism, we can give a
complete solution for the online quiz show problem:
A central authority initialize the system by running the Setup algorithm of the
extended construction, and distributes to each individual authority the master secret
(1)

(2)

keys mski , mski . Also as in the graded rewarding system, the central authority first prepares a set of user identities {id} together with ciphertexts {ci } for the
corresponding rewards by running Enc(id, mi , mpki , P ). Furthermore, the central
authority prepares the questions for each level, and distributes the hash value of the
answers hi to each individual authority. The registration is the same as in the graded
rewarding system. When the user starts the game and figures out the answer in
level-i, he sends the hash of the answer hi to the i-th authority together with his
choice “leave” or “continue”, then the authority will run KeyGen1 and KeyGen2
respectively, and returns the corresponding partial key to the user. The user runs the
Upgrade algorithm to get his secret key for level-i. When the user finally decides
to leave at level-j after providing true answer to the question, he uses his secret key
with level j and runs the Dec(cj , skj ) to retrieve the level j accumulated rewards.
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6.4.3

Proving a certain path was taken in a graph

An ordered authentication is needed in some applications like passport control, in
which people should pass gate 1 to n one by one to get each check done. We should
defend against the attack that a user jumps into the middle of the sequence say gate i
by e.g., corrupting some of the gate controllers, and escapes the check from gate 1 to
i − 1. This is one of the applications of proxy re-signature, as introduced in [2], here
we provide a simple alternative solution to this problem using our graded encryption.
The key factor for this problem is to provide a proof that a user already pass the
checkings of all previous gate controls. A simple observation is that the i-th gate
controller can simply encrypts a random message r under the user identity, using the
master public key with level (i − 1), and gives the encryption to the user. If the user’s
secret key is upgraded from level 0 to level i − 1 already, he will be able to decrypt
the encryption.
To be more specific, consider the following algorithms/protocols: Setup The central authority runs the Setup algorithm of the graded encryption scheme and distribute master public key mpki−1 and master secret key mski to gate controller i.
Check Whenever a user (say a traveller) arrives a checkpoint i, he first gives his
identity to the gate controller i. The gate controller i encrypts a randomly chosen
message r as ci = Enc(id, r, mpki−1 , P ), sends it to the traveler. The traveler decrypts ci as m0 = Dec(ci , ski−1 ), and sends it back. If m = m0 , then the traveler is
considered to have passed all the checkpoints from 1 to i − 1. The gate controller i
then checks the criterial for gate i, if pass as well, he prepares a partial secret key
pski = KeyGen(id, i, mski ) and sends pski to the traveller. Pass After passing the
checks from a gate controller i, the user upgrade his “certificate” using the partial
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secret by running the Upgrade algorithm and moves on to the next gate.
The semantic security of graded encryption guarantees that the traveler needs
all partial secret keys pskj up to level i to construct the secret key ski . Therefore,
holding a valid secret key of level i is enough to prove that the owner of the secret
key passed all checkpoints from 1 to i. Besides, this mechanism is very efficient. The
travelers upgrades his secret key whenever he gets a partial key. So he only keeps one
secret key at a time. Moreover, each checkpoint keeps only two keys; one to check
the validity of the secret key the traveler has, another to produce the partial secret
key.

Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis, we investigated a new functionality for privacy-preserving cryptosystems that enables a user to reveal only the number of sources he has contacted.
Within this scope, we first formalized two new primitives: graded signatures, graded
encryption; (i) graded signatures enables a user to combine a set of signatures on
a message m originating from ` different signers into a signature object in a way
that the final signature shows that ` distinct signers have signed on the message m,
without revealing the identities of the signers, and (ii) graded encryption enables a
sender to set a grade i to the ciphertext according to the importance of the plaintext
in the encryption so that the receiver can only decrypt it if he has been approved by
at least i authorities. We present efficient constructions for the primitives, i.e. the
construction for GS has secret key and ciphertext size of a constant number of group
elements, and the construction for GE achieves linear size signatures and verification
time. We also promote the primitives with useful applications such as multi-stage
games (e.g., “who wants to be a millionaire”) played in a distributed fashion and
104
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proving that a certain path was taken in a graph for graded encryption, and anonymous petition system and delegation of signing rights adhering to dynamic threshold
policies for graded signatures.
We observed that distributing the signing keys of graded signature scheme associated to different grades among the signers in an efficient way, enables us to get a
scheme with constant size signatures. Thus, we considered the signing keys as the
secrets to be shared, and reviewed the problem of minimizing the share size of a multisecret sharing scheme (MSSS) in the challenging setting when there are many secrets
to be shared and there is no public “bulletin board.” To circumvent the informationtheoretic lower bound (Blundo [13]), we dealer with the computational setting. A
simple generalization of computational secret sharing (Krawczyk [66]) to multi-secret
sharing yields a scheme with share size/overhead scaling linearly in `, the total number of secrets. To beat this linear scaling, we gave a construction of MSSS based on
a related notion of encryption, dynamic threshold public key encryption (DTPKE)—
that enables a sender to dynamically specify a threshold for each ciphertext. We first
proposed a new construction of a dynamic threshold public key encryption scheme
with improved efficiency characteristics. We then presented an efficient construction
of MSSS with share size only logarithmic in the number of secrets (hence effectively
optimal) based on the new DTPKE scheme
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